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Abstract 
 
HELMS, HUNT, AND WHITENESS: 
THE 1984 SENATE CAMPAIGN IN NORTH CAROLINA 
 
James Patrick Kellam 
B.A., Appalachian State University 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
 
 
Chairperson:  Dr. Karl E. Campbell 
 
 
 In 1984, the Democratic governor of North Carolina, Jim Hunt, challenged 
Republican Jesse Helms for his seat in the United States Senate, and the contest between the 
two Tar Heel politicians proved to be the most expensive non-presidential election in 
American history up to that time. Two decades after the Civil Rights Movement of the mid-
twentieth century, race continued to impact the politics of the American South. Helms won 
with a four percent margin over his Democratic rival by appealing to 63 percent of the vote 
cast by white Tar Heels, most of whom lived in rural North Carolina and the state’s small 
towns.1 The post-civil rights, emotionally-charged culture of whiteness in the Tar Heel 
state—the transcendence of anti-black racial prejudice and other cultural issues favored by 
white conservatives over class interests—informed the tactics used by the Helms campaign 
as well the response from Hunt’s campaign. Only by giving equal attention to both 
campaigns, their strategies, and tactics—particularly within the advertising battle that flooded 
																																																								
1	William A. Link, Righteous Warrior: Jesse Helms and the Rise of Modern Conservatism 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008), 302.	
	 v 
media outlets in the state for over a year—can the irrational influence of whiteness on North 
Carolina politics be understood. Moreover, a better grasp of whiteness illuminates not only 
the effects the culture has on American politics but how race is used by those seeking power 
within American political culture. 
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Introduction 
Two Politicians, Two Souths, and One Group of People 
 
The political contest between Senator Jesse Helms and Governor Jim Hunt defined 
the way with which southern politicians approached the political culture of the South in the 
decades after the Civil Rights era of the mid-twentieth century. Prior to the 1984 Senate 
campaign, both men achieved success in North Carolina politics. Helms won his Senate seat 
in 1972 and was re-elected in 1978. The Tar Heel state elected Hunt lieutenant governor in 
1972; put him in the governor’s mansion in 1976; and re-elected him governor in 1980. In 
1984, Hunt challenged Helms’s Senate seat and lost by four percentage points, 52 to 48. It 
was the only loss Hunt experienced in his political career and the closest margin of victory in 
any election in which Helms ran. One Greensboro journalist wrote that the election was not 
just a contest between two politicians, but a showdown “between the conservative Old South 
and the progressive forces of the New.”1 
Though certainly a contest between the Old and New Souths, the campaign between 
Helms and Hunt, the two most powerful politicians in North Carolina during the last three 
decades of the twentieth century, represented something deeper within the South’s politics. 
The two men pitched an eighteen-month political battle that conveyed two visions of the 
region. One sought the exclusion of others through the maintenance of the cultural status quo 
in order to appeal to white Tar Heels. The other attempted to gain the consent of white voters 
to expand the state’s politics beyond the center of power within the cultural confines of the 
traditional South through the cautious political inclusion of cultural others. They approached 
																																																								
1 William D. Snider, Helms and Hunt: The North Carolina Senate Race, 1984 (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 3. 
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the state’s electorate in different ways with different strategies heavily focused on attracting 
the votes of Tar Heel whites.  
Historians, political scientists, journalists, and sociologists have analyzed the 1984 
campaign in an effort to explain the forces at work within southern and North Carolina 
politics. Elements central to the campaign such as southern progressivism versus traditional 
conservatism, modernization versus traditionalism, and race have been thoroughly studied in 
an effort to show how and why Helms won the election. One point of broad consensus within 
the historiography was the influence of President Ronald Reagan’s victorious coattails on 
Helms’s victory. Another focus within the historiography, though with less consensus, has 
been Helms’s use of race within the campaign.2 
 Though the issue of race has been included within the analysis of the election, it has 
been treated as a peripheral element of the campaign with other factors having greater 
influence on the Tar Heel state’s electorate. Former editor of the Greensboro News & Record 
William D. Snider noted the role of race in the campaign, but argued that it was “the 
																																																								
2 For studies on the 1984 campaign see: See William D. Snider, Helms and Hunt: The North 
Carolina Senate Race, 1984 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985); 
Ernest B. Furgurson, Hard Right: The Rise of Jesse Helms (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1986) 165-187; Paul Luebke, Tar Heel Politics 2000 (Chapel Hill: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1998) 167-179, 184-188; Rob Christensen, The Paradox of North 
Carolina Politics: The Personalities, Elections, and Events That Shaped Modern North 
Carolina (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 248-255; William D. 
Link, Righteous Warrior: Jesse Helms and the Rise of Modern Conservatism (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2008), 271-305; Earl Black and Merle Black, The Rise of Southern 
Republicans (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2002), 105-106; Jesse Helms, Here’s 
Where I Stand: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 2005), 165-169; Gary Pearce, Jim 
Hunt: A Biography (Winston-Salem, NC: John F. Blair, Publisher, 2010), 148-189. For the 
consensus on Reagan’s coattails see: Snider, Helms and Hunt, 205-207; Furgurson, Hard 
Right, 187; Luebke, Tar Heel Politics 176; Christensen, The Paradox of Tar Heel Politics, 
255; Link, Righteous Warrior, 302; Black and Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans, 105-
106; Pearce, Jim Hunt, 187, 192. 
	 3 
senator’s vision” of less government regulation and strong enforcement of personal morals 
that allowed Helms to build a successful voter coalition with North Carolina business, blue-
collar workers, and rural Tar Heels. Historian William A. Link, one of Helms’s biographers, 
mentioned the senator’s “injection of the race issue,” but he only used that strategy to frame 
his campaign around a broad conservative ideology rather than addressing “concrete issues.” 
Raleigh journalist Rob Christensen claimed that Helms used “racially charged issues” such as 
the Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday to his advantage, but concluded that North Carolina’s 
conservative core propelled Helms to victory. North Carolina politician and sociologist Paul 
Luebke touched on both the senator’s use of race and the governor’s move to the political 
right during the campaign, but, in his “final analysis,” Helms proved to be a “one-of-a-kind” 
Republican that no North Carolina Democrat could beat in a statewide election.3 
 Political scientist Alexander Lamis noted the importance of racial attitudes, 
particularly those of white Tar Heel Democrats, in the election. Tensions surrounding race 
lessened in the two decades following the pinnacle of the Civil Rights Movement in the 
1960s. The ebb of racial tensions led to an “abatement of the race issue,” according to Lamis. 
This abatement allowed southern Democrats to build coalitions among black voters and 
white racial progressives throughout the South, allowing for a gradual realignment of blacks 
into the historically white Democratic Party and white racial conservatives into the 
traditionally racially moderate Republican Party. Throughout his political career, Hunt 
succeeded in garnering a substantial amount of white support, but the combination of the 
																																																								
3 Snider, Helms and Hunt, 214-215; Link, Righteous Warrior, 303; Christensen, The Paradox 
of North Carolina Politics, 255; Luebke, Tar Heel Politics, 188. 
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senator’s one-of-a-kind personality and, what Lamis called, “a polarized environment” kept 
the governor from being able to hold together his “diverse racial coalition.”4 
 Saying that Helms was a racist who used strategies couched in racism, however, does 
not fully address the issue of race in southern political culture. Whether primary or secondary 
in the motivations of southern politicians, race existed as the central issue, regardless of 
political party, when it came to communicating with the electorate in the South during the 
late twentieth century. In order to address this, a more nuanced explanation that considers the 
cultural prejudices that underlay the use of race as a political issue is needed. In other words, 
race would not be an effective strategic tool if it did not appeal to the culture in which a 
society’s politics exist. Those cultural prejudices constitute the foundation of the cultural 
hegemony of whiteness, the transcendence of anti-black racial prejudice and other cultural 
issues favored by white conservatives over class interests.5 
 With so much focus on Helms’s strategy and his use of race, less has been noted of 
Hunt’s strategy and the use of race in this campaign, which more fully displays the effect 
whiteness has on southern politics. Both candidates used race in order to persuade Tar Heel 
whites to vote for them. To understand how politicians used race in the decades following the 
1960s however, one must understand how whiteness influenced southern politics after the 
Civil Rights Movement. The overt use of race in the creation of racial slavery and Jim Crow 
segregation evolved into language and imagery that proved to be more insidious with the 
																																																								
4 Alexander P. Lamis, The Two-Party South, Expanded Edition (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 5, 131, 264. 
5 See Winthrop Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1968); Michelle Brattain, The Politics 
of Whiteness: Race, Workers, and Culture in the Modern South (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2001); Nell Irvin Painter, The History of White People (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2010). 
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success of the Civil Rights Movement of the mid-twentieth century, the rise of the black 
power movement in the late-1960s, and the outbreak of the culture wars of the 1970s. 
Whiteness during the late twentieth century relied less on overt racism and more on language 
and imagery couched in white middle-class values, such as “law and order” and “forced 
busing” during Nixon’s presidential campaign in 1972, and the use of  “welfare queens,” 
“states’ rights,” and the reduction of “big government” during the Reagan campaigns of 1980 
and 1984. White southerners, regardless of economic status, responded favorably to this new 
color-blind language, and though conservatives touted the universality of these values, they 
failed to appeal to the vast majority of southern blacks.6 
 Both candidates had found favor among North Carolina’s white electorate in their 
past elections. Jesse Helms exuded conservatism and traditionalism in his appeal to white 
conservatives. Prior to his switch to the Republican Party in September 1970, he was a 
member of the conservative wing of the southern Democratic Party. In 1950, he 
wholeheartedly supported the conservative Democrat Willis Smith in his campaign against 
the progressive Senator Frank Porter Graham. Following Smith’s victory, Helms went with 
Smith to Washington, D.C., and served as an administrative assistant on the senator’s staff. 
After winning his first Senate election in 1972, Helms campaigned for Ronald Reagan in 
North Carolina during the Republican presidential primary in 1976 and helped the up-and-
coming Republican win the Tar Heel state. He did the same in 1980 and continued his 
unwavering support of Reagan in the general election later that year. His political 
organization, the Congressional Club, revolutionized the way in which conservative 
																																																								
6 Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 5-6. 
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politicians raised money and conveyed awareness of conservative issues. He was a staunch 
anticommunist throughout his tenure as senator and his later chairmanship of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. His unwavering anticommunist convictions fueled his outlook 
and perceptions on foreign relations, particularly with respect to Latin America.7 
 Jim Hunt, by contrast, epitomized a new breed of southern progressive. He supported 
the development of North Carolina’s economy and the continued transition from its 
traditional agrarian roots. He marketed the Tar Heel state as business-friendly, favored lower 
taxes, and pushed hard to bring in new businesses, especially those involving modern 
technologies. He also pushed for reform of the state’s educational system in order to keep 
North Carolina competitive with other states. As Gary Pearce, Hunt’s former press secretary 
and 1984 campaign co-chairman, noted, the governor “preached a message for economic 
growth through better education that dominated the state’s agenda for years.” Hunt also 
brought minorities into integral parts of his gubernatorial administration, as well as other 
branches of the state’s government, including the state Supreme Court. He was the 
quintessential southern moderate and was careful to avoid being seen as too liberal by 
conservative elements within his constituency.8 
 Despite the differences between the two politicians, Helms and Hunt shared some 
common characteristics. Both men grew up in rural North Carolina and were raised in 
Christian households: Helms in Monroe, the seat of rural Union County in the southern 
Piedmont, and Hunt in Rock Ridge, a small agricultural community in Wilson County on the 
eastern Coastal Plain. Prior to 1970, they were both members of the Democratic Party, just as 
																																																								
7 Link, Righteous Warrior, 38, 95-104, 113-125; Helms, Here’s Where I Stand, 203-216. 
8 Pearce, Jim Hunt, 7. 
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any successful southern politician was before the break-up of the Solid South. In reaction to 
the success of the Civil Rights Movement, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society, and 
the Vietnam War, however, the politics of consensus that held the southern Democratic Party 
together became more difficult to maintain.  This prompted southern conservative 
Democrats, including Helms, to cross the political aisle to join the Republican Party.9 
 The two men also had one other thing in common: the need for votes from white 
North Carolina conservatives in order to win elections. These voters bridged the gap of party 
support enjoyed by both Helms and Hunt. Though used differently, both Helms and Hunt 
employed the hegemonic nature of whiteness throughout the 1984 campaign in order to 
attract this prized group of voters. Helms employed the exclusive nature of the hegemony 
based on race and cultural distinction to attract white voters, whereas Hunt attempted to 
utilize the inclusiveness of hegemony by proclaiming a largely color-blind message to white 
audiences throughout the state and a hesitance to get involved in cultural debates where 
various prejudices flourished.  
 This thesis explores the use of the hegemony of whiteness in southern political 
culture by demonstrating its prejudice-based construction beyond the institutional existence 
of racism and examining the campaign strategies of both Jesse Helms and Jim Hunt during 
the eighteen-month long Senate campaign of 1984. The first chapter introduces the cultural 
elements of whiteness that neutralize class antagonism and shows how the hegemony has 
remained consistent within the political history of the South from the colonial era to the late 
twentieth century. Along with whiteness’s consistency, chapter one analyzes the 
																																																								
9 Helms, Here’s Where I Stand, 3; Pearce, Jim Hunt, 11; Sean P. Cunningham, American 
Politics in the Postwar Sunbelt: Conservative Growth in a Battleground Region (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 76, 116, 120. 
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historiography of race in political culture to demonstrate how the tactics used to maintain the 
hegemony have evolved in response to challenges over time. The contribution of cultural 
intellectuals and the sciences of psychology and psychiatry included in the first chapter 
reveal the natural connections made through both human instinct and emotion that are 
involved in the formation of group formation, hegemony, and through that, the cultural 
construction of whiteness. 
 With an understanding of how the cultural hegemony of whiteness works, chapters 
two and three demonstrate how both Helms and Hunt used whiteness to garner the approval 
of much-sought-after white Tar Heel voters. The second chapter focuses on Helms’s explicit 
use of race to neutralize class difference among white North Carolinians and Hunt’s inability 
to construct a persuasive color-blind strategy that would bridge the gap between white 
conservative Democrats and the increased party participation of the state’s African American 
population. Chapter three explores wider cultural elements of whiteness. Helms combined 
race with other cultural themes throughout the last four months of the campaign—including 
homosexuality, Christian fundamentalism, nationalism, and abortion—that Hunt only 
hesitantly addressed, if at all. Hunt continued with his color-blind and issues-based message 
in an effort to address the concerns of white North Carolinians without alienating them. 
 A critical appraisal of primary sources constitutes the narrative of both chapters two 
and three. An analysis of the advertisements produced by both campaigns in visual, audio, 
and print media that bombarded North Carolina for over a year shows the voter groups 
Helms and Hunt targeted, white middle- and working-class North Carolinians. In the 
television ads that assailed the state, analyzing the images, rhetoric, music, and recurring 
themes the campaigns addressed, one sees the overwhelming presence of white North 
	 9 
Carolinians. The advertisements targeted issues important to the state’s white middle-class 
and working-class electorate—including agriculture, crime, Social Security, taxes, the size 
and scope of the federal government, and the threat of non-white and cultural others. With 
the whiteness of these television advertisements, one can readily see the near-total absence of 
black North Carolinians within the campaign’s visual and linguistic discourse. The News & 
Observer (N&O), in Raleigh, North Carolina, serves as the newspaper of record to help 
construct the narrative of the campaign, along with other news sources found in the James B. 
Hunt Papers in the Special Collections at North Carolina State University and the North 
Carolina Collection at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Helms’s memoir, 
Here’s Where I Stand, and Gary Pearce’s memoir of the campaign in his biography of Jim 
Hunt are used to provide a glimpse within the campaigns to see how they developed their 
strategies. 
 The contest between Jesse Helms and Jim Hunt took place during a pivotal moment 
in southern political history. After World War II, at the same time the Civil Rights 
Movement began climbing to its peak, the white middle-class exploded in the South. The 
region experienced incredible changes through the following decades. As the South became 
more economically sophisticated, so too did many of its white inhabitants. With the growth 
of a suburban middle class came a shift of political power that transferred the balance of 
power from the rural black belt into the southern metropolis and into the hands of white 
racial moderates and modern, pro-business conservatives. It remained, however, that white 
voters made up 83 percent of the electorate in the South in 1984, the plurality of whom 
described themselves as independent, regardless of registered party affiliation. In North 
Carolina, 80.1 percent of voters were white. Helms knew that to win he needed the 
	 10 
overwhelming approval of this group of people, since the other nearly 20 percent of nonwhite 
voters would be voting for Hunt. The governor knew he would need a substantial portion of 
the white electorate to vote for him, particularly white conservatives, since they largely 
outnumbered both the state’s black and liberal white electorate.10  
This knowledge and substantial majority gave white voters the power to influence the 
tactics used by Helms and Hunt to exercise their campaign strategies. Traditionally, most 
North Carolina politicians appealed to the overt racism of the eastern black belt. In the years 
after the demolition of Jim Crow, though the small cities of North Carolina had always been 
predominantly white, the political power of whiteness expanded into the suburban middle 
class in the twenty years after the Civil Rights Movement. Political scientist Tom Eamon 
called the 1984 campaign a “passion play,” and it indeed was. The target of both campaigns 
were the passions displayed through whiteness with regard to property and race. Both 
candidates knew it and responded with their appeals to Tar Heel whiteness to win.11  
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
																																																								
10 Earl Black and Merle Black, Politics and Society in the South (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1987), 44, 138; Frederick A. Day and Gregory A. Weeks, “The 1984 
Helms-Hunt Senate Race: A Spatial Postmortem of Emerging Republican Strength in the 
South,” Social Science Quarterly 69, no. 4 (December 1988): 944; Ginny Carroll, “N.C. 
Voters Increase 18 Percent Since ’80,” Raleigh News & Observer, October 20, 1984. 
11 V.O. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), 217-
218; Tom Eamon, The Making of a Southern Democracy: North Carolina Politics from Kerr 
Scott to Pat McCrory (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 216. 
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Chapter One 
The Insidious Hegemony: Whiteness In American Political Culture 
 
 In the late 1940s, political scientist V.O. Key published his study Southern Politics in 
State and Nation. Written prior to the breakup of the Democratic Solid South, Key’s work 
attempted to explain southern politics and the uncompetitive one-party system that had held 
almost insurmountable power from the turn of the twentieth century. In the introduction to 
his landmark work he noted that “whatever phase of the southern political process one seeks 
to understand, sooner or later the trail of inquiry leads to the Negro.” More than half a 
century later scholars still study southern politics, society, and culture, and the issue of race 
continues to emerge throughout the discussion, but their approach leads them not to black 
southerners, as Key believed. Rather, scholarly inquiry has shifted from focus on the “Negro” 
to the white South and its various attitudes toward southern blacks and the privileges inherent 
within white southern culture. Those attitudes and privileges have both changed and 
remained consistent over time and space, illustrating the shifting hegemonic foundation of 
the culture of whiteness.1 
																																																								
1 Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, 5. For studies on whiteness see, for example, 
George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Profit from 
Identity Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006); Winthrop Jordan, White 
Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1968); Nell Irvin Painter, The History of White People (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2010); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Shades of Freedom: Racial 
Politics and Presumptions of the American Legal Process (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996); Michelle Brattain, The Politics of Whiteness: Race, Workers, and Culture in the 
Modern South (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001); Angie Maxwell, The 
Indicted South: Public Criticism, Southern Inferiority, and the Politics of Whiteness (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press); David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: 
Race and the Making of the American Working Class, Revised Edition (New York: Verso, 
2007). 
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 Rather than emphasizing the consequences of individual or systemic racism, be it the 
attitude of a white supremacist or the de jure/de facto systems of segregation maintained 
through collective white supremacy, the cultural roots of white privilege are the focus of 
studies on whiteness. Where Key believed that all inquiry leads to southern blacks, the 
thought is incomplete. To truly understand not only southern political culture but also that of 
the United States in general, inquiry must focus on the hegemonic culture of whiteness and 
the power dynamics within it and the hegemony’s relationship with those from without it. 
 The insidious nature of whiteness exists almost invisibly within American political 
culture. Sociologist and professor of black studies George Lipsitz began his The Possessive 
Investment in Whiteness by quoting Richard Wright, a black author and intellectual, who said 
about America, “there isn’t any Negro problem; there is only a white problem.” Lipsitz 
argued that one can see plainly the “hidden assumptions” that exist within American culture 
through Wright’s statement. The primary assumption, Lipsitz noted, was that “racial 
polarization comes from the existence of blacks rather than from the behavior of whites, that 
black people are a ‘problem’ for whites rather than fellow citizens entitled to justice, and 
that, unless otherwise specified, ‘Americans’ means ‘whites.’” The same assumption lies 
within Key’s statement that any question regarding the politics of the South must lead to the 
“Negro,” thereby singling out southern blacks instead of addressing the racist attitudes within 
the white South that provided the foundation for Jim Crow. His statement supports the 
hidden nature of the assumption further through the invisibility of the whiteness within as it 
is only inferred as the opposite of the blackness of the Negro. This is how whiteness is able 
	 13 
to maintain its hold on American culture, as Richard Dyer noted, “because it is not seen as 
whiteness, but as normal.”2 
 As a product of the culture from which it emanates, the politics of the United States 
has contributed to the power of whiteness in America through the legislation and execution 
of government policy. Following World War II, federal housing policy displayed favor 
toward whites by providing funding for private realtors who operated openly with 
discriminatory mortgage loans. Lipsitz noted that metropolitan areas utilized federal funds in 
order to pay for “‘slum clearance’ programs” as well as the development of postwar 
suburbia. As these policies either discouraged affordable development for minorities in cities 
or forced them to move altogether due to freeway construction, the voice of urban minorities 
diminished under new overpasses and calls for urban renewal. In the 1980s and 1990s, social 
welfare policy saw reductions that disproportionately affected minorities with the reduction 
in federal education funds and a decline in the willingness to confront segregationist school 
systems. White politicians used the foundation of whiteness during this period as a “wedge” 
in order to “divide progressive coalitions along racial lines” and further political gains in 
order to derail the civil rights achievements of the previous decades, especially when 
speaking out against affirmative action and legislation to strengthen voting rights.3 
 Knowing how those in power use whiteness to their advantage provides only a 
portion of the story. The only way to truly understand whiteness is to know both what it is 
and how it works. The roots of whiteness took hold in the British colonies of North America 
																																																								
2 George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Profit from 
Identity Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006), 1; Richard Dyer, White (New 
York: Routledge, 1997), 10. 
3 Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness, 6, 8, 15, 16. 
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and the Caribbean during the mid-to-late seventeenth century when the term “white” began 
to replace the term “Christian” to differentiate settlers of European descent from those of 
other, non-white colors. First used as a social distinction and method of social control, after 
400 years whiteness has become part and parcel of American culture. To be sure, the 
manifestations of whiteness have changed in the four centuries of established European 
settlement of the New World. However, the primary symbol used to portray it, one’s skin 
color, has remained consistent and steady through myriad innovations of active white 
supremacy, expansions of those who have qualified to be white, and the suasive language of 
whiteness.4 
 In short, whiteness exists as a hegemony within American culture. Italian Marxist 
intellectual Antonio Gramsci defined the concept of cultural hegemony as “the ‘spontaneous’ 
consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on 
social life by the dominant fundamental group.” The definition itself is somewhat vague with 
little historical context through which to grasp the concept, for as historian T. J. Jackson 
Lears noted, “to give Gramsci his due, we need first to recognize that the concept of 
hegemony has little meaning unless paired with the notion of domination.” In this particular 
case, white people make up the “dominant fundamental group,” and it is this group that 
established order within American society.5 
																																																								
4 Theodore W. Allen, The Invention of the White Race: Volume II, The Origin of Racial 
Oppression in Anglo-America, with an Introduction by Jeffrey B. Perry, Second Edition 
(New York: Verso, 2012), 228. 
5 T.J. Jackson Lears, “The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities,” The 
American Historical Review 90, no.3 (June, 1985): 568; Edmund Morgan, American Slavery, 
American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
Inc., 1975), 328; see also Allan Kulikoff, Tobacco & Slaves: The Development of Southern 
Cultures in the Chesapeake 1680-1800 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1986), 261-313; Jordan, White Over Black,44-98. 
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 Though culture is dictated from the top of the social hierarchy, hegemony requires, as 
Lears paraphrased Gramsci, the “consent of subordinate groups” that exist on the lower rungs 
of the social ladder. In order to achieve this, Gramsci suggested that the ruling group must 
establish “a worldview that appeals to a wide range of other groups within the society,” and 
ensure those whom it is attempting to persuade that its primary interests, both ideologically 
and economically, are aligned with theirs. According to Gramsci, as the ruling group matures 
in its worldview and gathers influence, it develops into a “historical bloc,” which allows for 
both “cultural and economic solidarity.” Once the historical bloc is achieved, the dominant 
group within the bloc has to develop its own “spontaneous philosophy” that supports its 
interests while allowing for the consent of others the group wishes to include and maintaining 
the exclusion of those from which the bloc seeks to remain separate. The group’s new 
philosophy is made up of rhetoric, “common sense,” “folklore,” being made up of a group’s 
“popular religion” and its “entire system of beliefs,” all of which are communicated through 
language. As the hegemonic culture gains power through consent and its own dictation of 
interests, it continues to serve the “interests of ruling groups” within the bloc “at the expense 
of subordinate ones” without it.6 
 Gramsci’s spontaneous philosophies find their original spark in what anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz defined as symbols which are “interworked systems of construable signs.” 
With the adoption of symbols, groups of people come together and create a culture by means 
of “webs of significance” through which people find common connection. The symbols used 
by those to develop common connections aid in the construction of ideologies, the function 
of which, Geertz explained, “is to make an autonomous politics possible by providing the 
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authoritative concepts that render it meaningful, the suasive images by means of which it can 
be sensibly grasped.” Ideology exhibits itself as a “cultural symbol-system” when the rules of 
an institution that govern “behavior, thought, or feeling” become inadequate to maintain 
order within that institution. Once a group begins to feel strains within the connections of the 
group that are instigated by challenges from outside of the group, those who seek to maintain 
influence within the group create symbols to both keep the group together and preserve the 
structure of power within it.7 
 In order for an ideology to take hold as a cultural-system, it has to provoke a 
receptive response. Geertz argued that the “response capacities” of humans relate primarily 
to the culture within which the ideology develops, with “psychophysical” elements setting 
“the context within which precise activity sequences are organized” by already established 
“cultural templates.” Moreover, the “construction of ideologies,” in attempts to maintain 
order, are what make human beings “political animals.”8 
 The psychophysical elements, of which Geertz wrote, within culture provide the basis 
for the study of psychological phenomena that promote the construction of culture. Social 
psychologist Jonathan Haidt has analyzed the anthropological theories of culture put forth by 
Geertz and others and, combined with his own research, established what he calls Moral 
Foundations Theory. Through his theory, Haidt explained the similarities and differences 
with respect to cross-cultural experience and demonstrates the genetic predisposition to six 
moral foundations. Just as the bodies of human beings and the cultures in which they live 
have evolved over time, the human mind has experienced a “coevolution” that has been 
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instrumental in allowing people to foster connections beyond the family and promoting the 
creation of social groups. The six foundations that Haidt uses to establish his theory are care 
versus harm, fairness versus cheating, loyalty versus betrayal, authority versus subversion, 
sanctity versus degradation, and liberty versus oppression. These moral foundations are, as 
Haidt noted, “innate” within human beings prior to any exposure to cultural elements. Once 
exposed to culture, those innate foundations are “revised” and produce the diverse moral 
systems that exist “across cultures” while providing people with the ability to identify with 
those whom their moral systems identify.9 
 Haidt applied these six foundations to the formation of social structures, stating that 
“human beings are conditional hive creatures [emphasis his].” He cited sociologist Emile 
Durkheim in his argument that while human beings are individuals with individual emotive 
responses, there are “social facts” that exist through the interaction of people. Haidt noted 
that through these interactions, referred to as “collective emotions,” based on individual 
moral foundations, develop and find connection through empathy toward others who share 
common interests based on similar moral matrices.10 
 Haidt further established Geertz’s symbol systems as powerful emotional connections 
established within a group of people. The symbols a group uses to identify itself are what he 
referred to as “cultural innovations.” These innovations allow the group to “cooperate and 
cohere in groups larger than the family” and provide advantage against competing groups. 
They are copied by those who identify with them, and, as Haidt noted, “cultural innovations 
can be driven by intelligent designers—people who are trying to solve a problem.” Those 
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exhibiting similarities through cultural innovation empathize more strongly with one another, 
develop trusting relationships, and cooperate more readily. Within groups there is an innate 
expectation that “values and norms” will be shared. 11  
 The symbol system, as Geertz would call it, of whiteness originated from the color of 
a white person’s skin. Haidt’s notion of cultural innovations or Gramsci’s spontaneous 
philosophy revealed itself through the practice of racism based on the ideology of white 
supremacy that grew out of already established cultural notions of whiteness’s superiority to 
the inferiority of blackness. These all contributed to the development of the hegemonic 
culture of whiteness within American society. 
 The cultural prejudices from which whiteness developed existed long before the 
establishment of the hegemony within American society. Historians such as Winthrop 
Jordan, Edmund Morgan, Nell Irvin Painter and others have provided careful study of the 
development of racism through the evolution of the prejudice-based culture of whiteness 
during the colonial period, and its continued existence in American political culture through 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Prior to English colonization of North America, to 
racial slavery, even to the knowledge that “some men were black,” Winthrop Jordan noted 
that “the concept of blackness was loaded with intense meaning” for the citizens of England. 
Two centuries before Bacon’s Rebellion, the Oxford English Dictionary defined black as 
“deeply stained with dirt; soiled, dirty, foul … Having dark or deadly purposes, malignant; 
pertaining to or involving death, deadly; baneful, disastrous, sinister … Foul iniquitous, 
atrocious, horrible, wicked …. Indicating disgrace, censure, liability to punishment, etc.” The 
color white, by contrast, symbolized black’s antithesis. As an English poet mused, “Everye 
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white will have its blacke,/And every sweet its sowre.” White represented cleanliness, pure 
spirit, and closeness to God. When the English first came in contact with men and women of 
African descent prior to colonization in North America, the people with darker skin seemed 
to be, as Jordan put it, “the very picture of perverse negation.”12 
 The blight of blackness felt by the English exhibited closely related characterizations 
designated for the poor in England. In other words, class stratifications existed in England, 
and animus between the aristocracy and the poor and working class fermented a bigotry that 
would lay the foundation of racial prejudice. With the age of discovery, the wealthy elite 
within English society viewed the laboring and merchant classes as “masterless men” with no 
conviction to accept the social hierarchy, and went about, as Jordan noted, “begging, robbing, 
and raping” in order to fulfill “a barbarous or slavish desire to turn the penie.” As Don Jordan 
and Michael Walsh pointed out, those of the white under classes—including “vagrant 
children,” “petty criminals,” the Irish, and those “spirited away” by kidnappers who sought to 
make money on the trade in colonial labor—provided the primary source of labor through 
their indentured servitude. During the first century of English colonization of the New 
World, these white men, women, and children worked side-by-side with black men, women, 
and children, as well as for black landowners whose indentures had expired.13 
 In the aftermath of Bacon’s Rebellion in the late seventeenth century, these inter-
connected attitudes about race and class emerged. The unity of white and black labor began 
to diminish as colonial governments sought to divide the laboring class racially in order to 
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maintain the balance of power within the colonies. As the primary labor source in the 
southern colonies evolved from indentured servitude to racial slavery, colonial whites began 
amalgamating traditional attitudes toward blackness with those of the English poor. Black 
slaves came to be seen as lazy, licentious, ignorant, and full of “almost every Kind of Vice.” 
Colonial governments passed laws to keep the two races of the laboring underclass separate, 
including the outlawing of miscegenation in Virginia in 1691. As the eighteenth century 
approached, the term “white” came to be used in order to differentiate between the new racial 
groups within the colony, or as Theodore Allen noted, the term “servant” applied to bond-
laborers of European descent and “slave” for those of African descent.14 
 Despite the emergence of white skin privilege in the English colonies, there still 
existed a sizable white underclass. Lower-class whites, however, felt a sense of 
empowerment as the upper class used them to police their chattel, both black and white, who 
might take it upon themselves to run away or rebel. White colonists also sought to control 
and keep separate the blackness of slavery in order to quell the anxiety of possible slave 
rebellion and promoted the liberty of whiteness in colonial society in order to pacify any 
discontent felt among lower-class whites toward the upper class.15 
 This whitening of colonial America fueled the wave of populism that swept through 
the colonies during the second half of the eighteenth century. As landowners, both large and 
small, found a common interest in economic prosperity that wholly benefited the upper class, 
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and the shared privilege of white skin color, the populist movement gave rise to the liberating 
philosophy of republicanism favored first and foremost by the Virginia gentry. Those who 
owned slaves and had servants paralleled the tyranny exerted by King George III on them 
with the lack of freedom experienced by their own labor force. Those who did not own bond 
labor or land had to be satisfied with knowing that, as Allen noted, liberty was the “birthright 
of the poorest person in England” even though such a birthright provided no realistic 
opportunity of upward mobility except their social position over black slaves.16 
 Accompanying the drive for independence during the late eighteenth century was the 
continued animosity between the upper and lower classes of American whites, though 
buffered by the institutionalization of what Judge A. Leon Higginbotham called the “precept 
of inferiority” toward blacks. The consummate Virginian aristocrat Thomas Jefferson 
exhibited the widespread distrust and fear felt by the American gentry toward lower class 
whites when he wrote that the landless manifested “the instruments by which the liberties of 
a country are generally overturned,” and fear of black slaves continued to pacify the 
discontent felt by less-affluent whites toward the ruling class. The close proximity in which 
lower-class whites lived and worked with black slaves and freemen, particularly in the North, 
provided the means that allowed for the further entrenchment of racist attitudes within the 
consciousness of the white working class as the United States progressed through the early 
nineteenth century.17  
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The whiteness of colonial America and the early decades of the republic went through 
myriad innovations and several expansions in response to challenges from those who did not 
fully benefit from the privileges of whiteness. In her work The History of White People, 
historian Nell Irvin Painter illustrated the innovative nature of what she has termed the 
“enlargement of American whiteness.” Originally, the privilege of whiteness extended only 
to those whites who were free and who owned the requisite amount of property necessary to 
participate in the political process. Thelma Wills Foote noted the hegemonic nature of 
whiteness within the Constitution, particularly the three-fifths compromise in the second 
section of Article I. The compromise, suggested by James Madison, required the 
consideration of nonwhite slaves as both people and property and was essential in finding a 
way for a majority of the states to ratify the founding document due to the interests of the 
gentry from the southern states and its desire to protect its wealth, property, and political 
power.18  
Whiteness resided elsewhere within the governing document, particularly Section 
nine of Article I, the slave-trade clause, which prohibited Congress from ending the Atlantic 
slave trade prior to 1808, and Article IV, the third clause in Section two, the fugitive-slave 
clause. Together with the three-fifths compromise, all three of these clauses found their way 
into the constitutional debate due to what historian Don Feherenbacher called slavery’s 
“brooding presence in the land.” Though the three clauses, particularly the fugitive-slave 
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clause, had “corrosive effects on national unity,” the framers added them in an effort to 
promote cohesiveness within the union. It still remained, as Ferhenbacher noted, that the 
government’s founding document “dealt with slavery in several places but never once called 
the institution by name,” thus enshrining the insidious nature of whiteness into American 
constitutional law.19  
 The property qualification for voting remained in effect throughout the eighteenth 
century. During the first half of the nineteenth century, state governments began dropping the 
property requirement to vote, providing, Painter stated, “virtually all male Europeans and 
their free male children” their voting rights. She referred to this as the “first enlargement of 
American whiteness.” As those in power expanded whiteness, they maintained the 
exclusionary practice of whiteness at the same time. White Americans continued in their 
denial of rights to free blacks and Native Americans as the United States moved westward, 
and with the country’s manifest destiny came its inseparable relationship with, as Foote 
noted, “racial domination.”20  
 With white domination over black slaves and freemen, it remained that blacks, 
regardless of status, were inherently inferior, but an influx of Irish immigrants through the 
first half of the nineteenth century posed a new problem for those who benefited from their 
whiteness. As the sectional debate over racial slavery reached fevered pitch, resulting in the 
Civil War from 1861 to 1865, Europeans began immigrating to the United States in droves 
during the mid-nineteenth century. Among these were the Irish who moved into northeastern 
cities during the 1840s in large numbers. The presence of these new Catholic immigrants 
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provoked long-held resentment among white Anglo-Saxon Protestants of English stock. 
Though white-skinned, the Irish found themselves segregated from white America. Made the 
butt of jokes, white Anglo-Saxon Protestants saw the Irish as little better than blacks, either 
enslaved or free. The Irish, though economically and culturally disenfranchised, enjoyed 
political patronage in that, once naturalized, they obtained the right to vote and other basic 
rights of citizenship, which allowed for what Painter called the “second enlargement of 
American whiteness.” Black Americans, however, continued to live under the precedent 
established by Chief Justice Roger Taney, in the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Dred 
Scott v. Sandford (1857), that African Americans were a subordinate class of people and “had 
no rights or privileges but such as those” that white people allowed them to have. 21 
 With the end of the Civil War and passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution following the Civil War, most Americans thought 
that the United States solved the contradiction of the subjugation of black people through the 
actions carried out and the legal framework formed by whites. Foote wrote that many 
believed the United States had “eliminated the aporia of American democracy.” However, 
following Reconstruction, white politicians in the South continued to use the cultural 
prejudices, fueled by the belief in black inferiority, inherent within whiteness in their quest to 
defeat the sustained challenge to white culture. Along with white aggression, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) laid the foundation for a new version of 
southern whiteness known as “separate but equal,” allowing Jim Crow’s racist hand to take 
																																																								
21 Painter, The History of White People, 201, 205; Higginbotham, Shades of Freedom, xxv, 
64. 
	 25 
hold of southern law and politics and tightly maintain its grip through the first half of the 
twentieth century.22 
 With the hegemony deeply entrenched in the culture of the South and the region’s 
politics, historians, political scientists, sociologists, and journalists have provided thoughtful 
study on southern politics and race in recent American history. The historiography of 
southern politics during the twentieth century shows the continued existence of whiteness. 
Also shown are the tactics used to maintain the hegemony that changed dramatically in 
response to challenges prompted by quickly moving social forces that threatened the white 
status quo that established southern cultural standards. 
 The partition of racial segregation and the outright denial of suffrage for African 
Americans that began with the institution of Jim Crow once again insulated whiteness from 
the challenge of the non-white other. Certainly, slavery had been abolished, but whiteness 
found new life full of vigor in the South. By 1898, Mississippi, South Carolina, and 
Louisiana had successfully eliminated the voting franchise for black voters. In North 
Carolina, white Republican governor Daniel Russell, who had been elected through what 
journalist Rob Christensen called the “pitchfork revolution,” made up of the fusion of poor 
white farmers and blacks, in 1896, hid in the baggage car of the train that carried him through 
the eastern side of the state in order to avoid lynch mobs in 1898. He served as governor of 
the Tar Heel State until Charles Brantley Aycock replaced him in 1901.  A Republican would 
not sit in the governor’s chair in North Carolina until after Jim Holshouser’s election in 
1972.23  
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 Aycock, a Democrat and outspoken white supremacist, helped lead the charge of 
reinvigorated whiteness during the midterm election in 1898. Under his leadership, the 
Democratic Party won 134 out of 170 seats in the General Assembly and gave Democrats the 
power needed to maintain control of the state through the first half of the twentieth century. 
With their success came the disenfranchisement of Tar Heel blacks. The newly elected 
assembly passed a suffrage amendment to the state constitution that required all North 
Carolinian voters to reregister, “to pass a literacy test, and to write a section of the state 
constitution.” When the amendment was passed, 53 percent of blacks in the state could not 
read or write compared with 19 percent of whites. To ensure the suffrage of white Tar Heels, 
the amendment included exemptions for those who were allowed to vote prior to 1867, as 
well as their descendants. With a protective hedge surrounding the voting booth, the power of 
whiteness in the Tar Heel state was secure.24 
 In 1903, Governor Aycock gave a speech to the North Carolina Society of Baltimore, 
Maryland, and stated that it was time that “the negro learn once and for all that there is 
unending separation of the races . . . let the white man determine that no man shall by act or 
thought or speech cross this line, and the race problem will be at an end.” The fusion 
movement that elected Russell and sent Congressman George H. White, a black man from 
New Bern, to Washington, D.C. came to an end. Six years prior to Aycock’s address 
underlining the ideology of white supremacy, eleven blacks had served in the state’s General 
Assembly and were swiftly voted out of office with the wave of white supremacy that swept 
over the Tar Heel state. A black North Carolinian would not be sent to Congress again until 
the elections of Eva Clayton and Mel Watt in November 1992. Throughout the first half of 
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the twentieth century, the disenfranchisement of blacks provided the mechanism that allowed 
for the political suppression of challenges to the hegemony of whiteness.25 
 African Americans represented only a portion of the disenfranchised in American 
politics during the first half of the twentieth century, and this posed a problem for a balance 
of power in favor of those privileged in their whiteness. Immigrants from southern and 
eastern Europe, namely Italians, Jews, and Slavs, felt the exclusionary practices of whiteness 
as well. Due both to religious differences and the fear of Bolshevism, white America at first 
refused to accept these new Europeans through anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic, and anti-
communist discrimination. However, as the labor-union movement grew through the first 
decades of the twentieth century, many of these immigrants found a home in the American 
working class and the Democratic Party, particularly with the advent of the Great Depression 
and the politics of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal.26 
 The coalition of working-class whites, ethnic minorities, and blacks that developed 
within the Democratic Party under Roosevelt’s New Deal provided a means to crack the 
powerful, race-based institution of southern Democrats. The inclusion of blacks into the 
national Democratic Party directly confronted the whiteness of the party in the South. The 
cross-race coalition proved tenuous however in the southern states as white labor unions in 
the South failed to challenge the segregation of work places and remained staunchly in favor 
of the same Jim Crow policies favored by white factory owners that maintained the economic 
and political disenfranchisement of southern blacks.27 
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 As African Americans found a place on the fringe of FDR’s New Deal coalition 
during the Great Depression and World War II, the southern and eastern Europeans who 
planted roots in the United States earlier in the twentieth century earned their acceptance into 
the hegemony of whiteness. Already accepted by labor unions, these immigrants and their 
progeny enjoyed inclusion in the programs developed through the New Deal by Roosevelt 
and the Democratic Party, including the Federal Housing, Social Security, and Wagner Acts. 
Though none of the New Deal legislation explicitly mentioned race, the majority of African-
Americans failed to receive the benefits provided by these programs due to the occupational 
restrictions within the Social Security and Wagner Acts. The bills excluded a large portion of 
the black labor force, including farm laborers and domestic workers, as well as teachers, 
librarians, and social workers. The Federal Housing Act allowed for the racial categorization 
of appraisals and applicants which provided a way for private mortgage companies to use 
local Jim Crow laws to discriminate on the basis of race.28 
 During World War II, frustrated African Americans sought to address their lack of 
freedom in the United States while they fought to free people oppressed in both Europe and 
the Pacific. Black Americans initiated the March on Washington Movement of 1941 and the 
“Double Vee” campaign, and their efforts provided limited success, provoking Roosevelt’s 
Executive Order 8802 that demanded the practice of fair employment regardless of race. 
President Harry S. Truman established his Civil Rights Commission, signed Executive Order 
9981 that integrated the United States military in 1948, and included civil rights for African 
Americans in his re-election campaign.29 
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 Following their service during World War II, the veterans of southern and eastern 
European descent arrived home as heroes and received the government’s gratitude through 
their inclusion as recipients of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, or GI Bill, which 
constituted the “third enlargement of American whiteness.” With this benefit, about half of 
the returning veterans received government subsidies that provided a total of $14.5 billion to 
pay for college educations. The government also instituted the Veteran Mortgage Guarantee 
program that, with the Federal Housing Authority, provided veterans and their families with 
mortgages at substantially lower rates than those issued by private financial institutions. In 
thirty years, from 1934 to 1964, the two government programs financed over $120 billion in 
home mortgages, with most of these new homes being built in the quickly developing 
suburbs that grew out of what Woodward called the “bulldozer revolution,” and the growth 
of urban centers throughout the southern United States. As white people moved into the 
sprawling suburbs with federally subsidized mortgages, white southern politicians continued, 
within the color-blind legislation that authorized the housing subsidies, the practice of local 
residential laws. In the South, that meant neighborhoods with established color lines 
maintained the exclusion of black southerners from the suburban movement during the post-
war era. From 1932 until 1962, 98 percent of the loans distributed by the FHA went to white 
Americans due to the racial categories stipulated by the federal government and the Jim 
Crow policies established by local mortgage companies.30 
 Though disenfranchised, black Americans continued to challenge whiteness, and, in 
May 1954, the Supreme Court presented its decision in the case of Brown v. Board of 
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Education. The Court concluded that “in the field of public education the doctrine of 
‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” The 
overturning of segregation provided through the separate but doctrine established by the 
Plessy v. Ferguson decision in 1894, and embraced by southern white supremacists set the 
stage for a decade long battle between the whiteness of southern politics and its opposition 
from southern blacks. As C. Vann Woodward noted, the Brown decision “marked the 
beginning of the end of Jim Crow” and presented southern whiteness its greatest challenge 
yet.31 
 Southern states reacted to the Brown decision in different ways and with various 
levels of anger toward what southern whites believed to be an overreach by the federal 
government. North Carolina’s neighbor to the north, Virginia, adopted a segregation strategy 
based on “massive resistance” to the Brown decision that sought to shut down the state’s 
public school system in favor of a private school system that could legally maintain 
segregationist policies. North Carolina took a different approach in 1956 that came to be 
known as the Pearsall Plan. The plan permitted the closure of state public schools in response 
to desegregation while providing aid to white families that wished to send their children to 
segregated private schools. Though it allowed for the closure of schools, the plan did not stop 
school districts from planning for desegregation. Black families bore the responsibility of 
petitioning for desegregation, thereby releasing white families and white school board 
members from any involvement in this latest opposition to white supremacy. With much of 
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the state withstanding the nullification of Plessy, schools in Piedmont cities such as 
Charlotte, Greensboro, and Winston-Salem carried out what sociologist Paul Luebke called 
“token desegregation,” with a total of twelve students in the three cities’ school systems. 
White Tar Heel progressives used such tokenism to claim that the state had responded as fast 
as it could. Tar Heel blacks, however, perceived the plan as a commitment to the racial status 
quo and attributed it to the state’s “shrewdness in opposing racial change.” As black North 
Carolinians lamented the state’s refusal to address inequality, other southern states applauded 
North Carolina’s ability to continue the practice of segregation and maintain its whiteness.32 
 The stringent divisions between black and white North Carolinians forced the state’s 
political leadership to continue its tightrope act, attempting to maintain the balance of power 
while giving an ear to the concerns of disenfranchised Tar Heels, and often failed doing so. 
Governor Luther Hodges helped establish the Pearsall Plan following Brown, but prior to his 
election, Governor William Umstead sent segregationist Sam Ervin to the United States 
Senate in 1954, and he arrived just after the Warren Court released its decision on Brown. 
Before he left for Washington, Ervin noted in a letter to a confidant that “Whoever goes to 
the Senate will be charged with direct responsibility for assisting in ending this political 
trend.” The senator believed segregation to be “a basic natural law” and that “whenever and 
wherever people are free to choose their own associates, they choose as their associates 
members of their own race.” To justify his segregationist beliefs at the same time when 
blacks were challenging the power of whiteness in the Tar Heel state, Ervin, like most white 
southerners, held responsible those “bungling busybodies who have no personal contact with 
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the conditions out of which the problem arises,” namely, as historian Karl E. Campbell noted, 
“the meddling outsiders,” or northerners.33 
 The unrelenting protests of white supremacists continued, and even escalated, in 
North Carolina in response to Brown and the comparatively mild-mannered defense of 
segregation that Tar Heel politicians such as Hodges instituted. State senator Julian 
Allsbrook stated that the “fundamental issue [was] whether the Anglo-Saxon race [was] to 
become a mongrel race” at the annual convention of North Carolina’s Democratic Party in 
May 1956. The previous fall, four civil rights lawyers’ homes were bombed in Charlotte 
because of their advocacy for further social integration, and the perpetrators were never 
arrested.34 
 During the Senate hearings on civil rights legislation proposed by the Eisenhower 
administration in 1957, Ervin suggested what Campbell referred to as a “soft southern 
strategy.” This new strategy included a stance against civil rights equality based on 
conservative interpretation of constitutional law and upheld what William Chafe called the 
“progressive mystique” of North Carolina’s paternalistic attitude of race relations. The new 
strategy proved effective and led the way to weakening the bill with the successful addition 
of an amendment that struck at the heart of Title III within the legislation. The law would 
allow African Americans to file injunctions when making the claim that they were denied the 
right to vote. Such injunctions bypassed, in Ervin’s opinion, the constitutional right to a trial 
by jury. The senator who led the constitutionally-based charge against Richard Nixon nearly 
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two decades later used the same document to add what Campbell called a “veneer of 
respectability to the southern defense of racial desegregation.” Ervin’s leadership and 
constitutional argumentation provided for passage of a weak civil-rights bill with a vote of 
seventy-two for and eighteen against. As Campbell noted, predictably, all “nay” votes came 
from the “South’s die-hard segregationists.”35 
 Following Ervin’s appointment to the United States Senate and the creation of the 
Pearsall Plan, North Carolina elected white progressive Terry Sanford governor in 1960. 
Though progressive, the whiteness of the Tar Heel state limited the progress for which he 
campaigned. He supported continued segregation but sought to avoid the drama of massive 
resistance experienced throughout the South, notably the incursion of the National Guard to 
protect efforts at school integration in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957 or the closure of public 
schools Virginia carried out in response to Brown. Instead of massive resistance, Sanford 
said the Tar Heel state needed “massive intelligence.” Sanford later stated in an interview 
with North Carolina Public Television that he had not “wanted to avoid that issue 
[segregation]. I just didn’t want that issue to be dominant.” In order to win election, Sanford 
knew that he needed the votes of both blacks, who made up ten percent of voters, and whites, 
many of whom were segregationists. Sanford won the contest against avid segregationist I. 
Beverley Lake with 54.5 percent of the vote.36 
 Tar Heel blacks refused to back down to the government’s refusal to desegregate or 
the white power protests of white Tar Heels. In 1962 and 1963, the Congress of Racial 
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Equality (CORE) organized protests against segregation and inequality in restaurants and 
hotels throughout the North Carolina Piedmont. In May 1963, the city of Greensboro arrested 
1,200 protesters in just under two weeks, but the protests were successful in pushing city 
leaders to integrate businesses in the city. Though the state lacked the violence reported on 
television sets and in newspapers that occurred in the Deep South, Jim Crow maintained a 
tenuous hold on white Tar Heels, but the state’s black population continued with its 
opposition to Tar Heel whiteness and its pressure on the state’s government.37 
 At the same time that black students were organizing sit-ins and protests in North 
Carolina hotels and restaurants, a group of some 500 students from Shaw University took 
their complaints to the governor’s residence, the Executive Mansion in Raleigh. The 
protesters chanted unrelentingly “We want the governor” until Sanford stepped away from a 
concert being held in the residence to address the disgruntled crowd. The governor waited for 
the crowd to die down, and when it did, he stated that he would be “glad to talk . . . about any 
of your problems, any of your grievances, any of your hopes. This is not the time or place.” 
He continued, telling the students that they were not “bothering” him, and permitted them to 
stay because he “enjoyed the singing.” He further charged that none of the students had 
“come to me with any requests,” to which one of the protesters replied that he “should have 
known our troubles.” The governor lectured to the students that “you’re in a democracy.” 
The crowd booed Sanford’s response, but dissipated peacefully.38 
 With these newest attacks on Tar Heel whiteness in the 1960s, the Ku Klux Klan 
reemerged in North Carolina with its greatest influence occurring in the rural east but with 
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limited appeal throughout the state. In 1964, the Klan burned a cross in Raleigh at the 
Executive Mansion, and the next spring carried out cross burnings throughout the state. It 
attracted attendances of 6,000 for a cross burning in Sampson County and 5,000 at a Klan 
wedding held outside Farmville. The House Committee on Un-American Activities 
performed an investigation on the resurgence in 1965 and noted that “North Carolina [was] 
by far the most active state for the United Klans of America.” The resurgence was not 
statewide, with the majority of the 112 active klaverns located in the eastern part of the state, 
which historically had been home to the largest segment of North Carolina’s black 
population.39 
 By the early-to-mid 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement in the South had grown 
considerably. The Brown decision had nullified the doctrine of “separate but equal” in 1954; 
Rosa Parks had taken her seat on the bus in Montgomery, Alabama, and launched the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955; Martin Luther King Jr. had shared his dream in 
Washington, D.C. in 1963; and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and CORE were organizing blacks of 
all ages and walks of life against the power of whiteness exhibited by the southern laws of 
Jim Crow. Southern racists were running out of ways to defend the whiteness within the 
evocative images and news coming out of the South. 
 To quell further activism against Tar Heel whiteness, North Carolina politicians used 
a method that had worked during the Graham-Smith primary of 1950, the tying together of 
the movement of racial equality with that of anti-communist sentiment, and produced the 
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Speaker Ban Law of 1963. The law required state-funded institutions of higher learning to 
refuse the right of those who were “known to advocate the overthrow of the United States or 
the State of North Carolina; [or] has pleaded the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States in refusing to answer any question with respect to Communist or subversive 
connections, or activities” to speak on their campuses. Though the law was short-lived, 
having been deemed unconstitutional in 1968, it illustrated the desperate measures Tar Heel 
hardliners were willing to take in order to silence the challenge to the deeply rooted power of 
whiteness within state institutions.40 
 The Civil Rights Movement’s challenge to southern whiteness reached national 
prominence with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Prior to its passage, Sam Ervin 
passionately defended the status quo, recalling the influence of old southern grievances, the 
right of the states to govern themselves, and arguing the constitutional limits set on the 
federal government. In an exchange with Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, the Tar Heel 
segregationist argued, “I will admit that we have many unsolved problems down there. But I 
think we could solve them much better if we did not get so much interference from up here 
on the banks of the Potomac.” He also defended his past contributions to black equality in 
North Carolina as a member of various governmental institutions such as his local school 
board, the state legislature, and judge. However, as Campbell pointed out, while the senator 
“addressed some of the most grievous inequalities of the Jim Crow system . . . Ervin had 
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worked to improve the lives of individual African Americans within the system . . . [but] had 
never attempted to reform the system itself.” 41 
 Tar Heel whiteness, having been dealt the blow of Brown and the continuous 
challenges from the Civil Rights Movement, was under attack from the federal government. 
Ervin described the bill as an “exaltation of government tyranny.” Governor Sanford 
maintained that the proposed civil rights bill was a matter not for the federal government to 
legislate but for the individual states to rectify. The long historical memory of southern 
whites no-doubt recalled the lessons of southern victimization of northern aggression and 
despicable carpetbaggers taught by their parents and grandparents. Their cultural memory 
informed them concerning how those outside forces attempted to defy southern tradition and 
the right of southern states to govern themselves while ignoring the plight forced on blacks 
through the exclusion of Jim Crow and the privilege of whiteness.42 
 The progressive nature of North Carolina had limits, and those limits have been no 
better depicted than when the whiteness of the Tar Heel state had to play defense rather than 
offense. As sociologist and representative to the North Carolina House of Representatives 
Paul Luebke noted, the progressive cause of modernization “recognized in theory the 
legitimacy of racial equality but hesitated to take the necessary steps to achieve it unless they 
saw no alternative.” With the avid protest and filibuster of southern white senators, including 
Sam Ervin, the Civil Rights Act passed on June 10, 1964, and just over a year later, Congress 
passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965. With these two landmark pieces of legislation, the last 
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desperate grasps of Jim Crow slipped away to become another instance of southern 
memory.43 
 With the overt whiteness of Jim Crow segregation abolished, blacks became more 
visible and more vocal in a politics that had been overwhelmingly driven by the whiteness of 
southern political culture. The overtly racist sentiment of segregationists became less popular 
among many racially-moderate whites who supported racial equality. As a result, since the 
Civil Rights Movement, whiteness has become more covert. During the post-civil rights era, 
Gramsci’s spontaneous philosophy that roots a hegemony’s foundation in language, as well 
as conventional wisdom, systems of belief, and cultural memory, forced the language of 
whiteness to change. Politicians who used overt whiteness as a foundation of power had a 
problem because the language previously used to defend Jim Crow no longer curried political 
favor with the majority of Americans. They found their solution in the rhetoric of color-blind 
politics. Evocative phrases such as the “Silent Majority,” “law and order,” “forced busing,” 
and “welfare queens” roused middle- and working-class whites’ antipathy toward racial 
equality in the 1970s and 80s without uttering any blatantly racial epithet. Such tactics gave 
an invisibility to whiteness with an appeal to the distinctly white middle-class notion of 
individual merit that had developed in white suburbia during the post-war era. Whiteness 
continued, but those using the hegemony for their benefit found a new method of employing 
it.44 
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 In order for whiteness to maintain its grasp on political culture in even the most subtle 
of ways, it has to appeal to the individuals through whom the power dynamics of the 
hegemony are exercised. One of the ways with which power is maintained in American 
political culture is through the individual citizen’s behavior on election day, guided by his or 
her response to a candidate, and indicated by decisions made in the voting booth. In a 
representative democracy, the rhetoric used by a candidate, a candidate’s party, and his or her 
campaign allows for emotional connections to develop between the politician seeking to win 
election and the citizen exercising his or her right when an election takes place. Once the 
emotional connection is set, be it positive or negative, the emotions fostering that connection 
guide one’s rationale and help the voter identify with or against the politician. Since the 
disenfranchisement put in place by previous Jim Crow laws had been abolished, whites 
anxious to maintain the racial status quo turned to less offensive rhetoric in order to blur class 
distinctions and to attract working-class and middle-class white voters. This new brand of 
conservatism proved incredibly successful. Richard Nixon used it to garner the approval of 
the “Silent Majority” of the white middle class in both 1968 and 1972, and Ronald Reagan 
proved its worth in his elections of 1980 and 1984.45 
 Clifford Geertz noted, as had Aristotle long before, that human beings are “political 
animals.” As such, human behavior is driven by instinct. Instincts enable people to make 
decisions on the fly, typically in the hope of evading danger, quelling a threat, or maintaining 
a sense of security. One method of finding security and pacifying the emotions fueling the 
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anxiety of insecurity is an individual’s instinctual need for membership within a group. As 
Haidt noted, human beings are “groupish.” When one feels threatened, he or she seeks solace 
within a collection of people with whom they share a common sense of security. In order to 
become a part of the group, however, one must adhere to the group’s principles, or 
ideologies. Being included within a group is conditional and, excluding membership dues, 
one must conform to the beliefs held by the group of which one wishes to be a part.46 
 However, the group has to protect itself from competing groups that adhere to 
contentious ideologies that may force group members to question the very fabric that holds 
the group together. The desire for power in order to preserve a sense of security is the 
primary need of any group, particularly one experiencing a perceived threat from another. 
One method used to solidify group security is the enforcement of uncompromising ideology 
so that the group continues to exclude those who do not hold similar ideologies. Doing so, 
however, means risking the alienation of others whom the group needs to attract in order to 
retain power. Group leaders may change the way through which the group’s ideology is 
displayed or practiced in order to broaden the parameters of inclusion, allow more members, 
and ensure that the power the group holds maintains balance in its favor. Inclusion is the only 
way in which a group nurtures its long-term survival for both the group and the members 
within it. The practice of conditional inclusion and the innovations made by group leaders 
provide the basis of hegemonic power and the continued survival of the hegemony.47 
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 Painter’s “fourth enlargement” of the hegemony of whiteness began with the African-
American Civil Rights Movement and the eventual passage of the Civil Rights Act and 
Voting Rights Act of 1964 and 1965, respectively. At the same time, the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1965 allowed for increased immigration from non-European lands, such as 
Asia, Latin America, and Africa. This most recent enlargement, according to Painter, 
continues into the present. Though skin color seems to be less important in determining 
whiteness, it still plays a part, and poor blacks remain at the bottom of the social ladder. Just 
as significant, as traced back to the establishment of American whiteness, is the privilege that 
comes with property and wealth.48 
 Jim Crow kept blacks of not only out of the political arena and the social mainstream 
but also the current of economic growth. African Americans in the South enjoyed little in the 
way of upward economic mobility, and the politics of segregation and disenfranchisement 
barred them from any sizable inclusion into the distinctly white middle class. Not until the 
Civil Rights Act and its Title VII did blacks receive government protection from economic 
discrimination and the guarantee of employment equality through the creation of the Equal 
Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC). Black Americans, particularly in the 
South, finally had the gates to whiteness opened to them. Yet, the Affirmative Action 
policies instigated by passage of Title VII, such as the Philadelphia Plan, drew the ire of 
conservative whites and their political representatives who added these policies to their list of 
grievances and expanded the color-blind rhetoric that further solidified white working- and 
middle-class support.  Even with the gates of equal employment opened, the economic 
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disparity between African Americans, other minorities, and whites remained wide and 
continued to remain so until the opening decades of the twenty-first century.49 
 The politics of social and economic inclusion that provided the development of the 
latest enlargement of whiteness provided the fodder needed by southern conservatives to 
defend the normalcy of whiteness under the cover of color-blind political rhetoric in the 
1970s and 80s. Howard Zinn noted that though white southerners had held white supremacist 
attitudes toward southern blacks during the decades of the Civil Rights Movement, their 
bigotry ranked lower on what he called their “hierarchy of desires,” referring to their 
economic well-being. With the institution of Affirmative Action, however, white southerners 
felt the threat of black encroachment on their ability to make a living. It also forced southern 
progressives to change their rhetoric. Rather than focusing rhetoric that displayed the 
differences of the people they wanted to include in the mainstream, inclusiveness without 
difference became the strategy of southern Democrats who attempted to lump working-class 
and middle-class whites and blacks into one group. Anyone who differed from the white, 
conservative mainstream—blacks, homosexuals, women, and others who were not white and 
male—were collected together under terms like “progress” in order to blur the distinctions 
between the “haves” and “have-nots” within the cultural construct of whiteness. While both 
parties attempted to appeal to the sense of fiscal security of southern whites, the Republican 
Party fared better among those who succeeded in moving up the economic ladder and proved 
to be the party that white southerners believed advocated for their economic self-interest.50 
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 Though the free-enterprise message preached by Republicans swayed southern white 
voters to the Republican Party, the influence of the rise of conservative Christians in the 
South’s political discourse accompanied the party’s appeal to the region’s white 
conservatives. With the decision of the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade in 1973, the proposal 
of the Equal Rights Amendment, and the increased participation of homosexuals in political 
discourse, the Republican Party embraced southern Christian conservatives who sought to 
counter these perceivable attacks on southern values. Even though many southern blacks held 
the same conservative Christian values against issues such as abortion and homosexuality, 
white evangelical Christians failed to accept the black struggle against continued institutional 
racism. This kept the vast majority of black Christians from identifying with these new 
cultural causes laced within the Republican Party’s message and helped maintain the cultural 
divisions based on traditional whiteness within southern politics.51 
 In one instance, culture is defined as “the customs, arts, social institutions, and 
achievements of a particular nation, people, or other social group.” As Lipsitz noted, 
“whiteness is everywhere.” It exists in art, film, literature, and especially politics. Politicians 
campaign on it, white people benefit from it, and minorities are oppressed and differentiated 
by it. W.E.B. Dubois called whiteness an “Empire” that dominates “through political power 
built on the economic control of labor, income and ideas.” However one labels it, white 
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people only knowingly experience the presence of whiteness when the privilege that comes 
with it is challenged.52  
 It is within the stealthy confines of whiteness that has existed in American culture 
since the dawn of the Republic, and its division from cultural others, where the construct of 
race in cultural contexts can best be understood. For most of its history, as historian James 
Cobb noted, the South has existed with the supremacy of the culture of whiteness and an 
oppressed culture of blackness. These differences in culture informed the historical memory 
of the regions white and black inhabitants in the last decades of the twentieth century. 
Women and others who failed to conform to the traditions of southern whiteness also viewed 
southern history and the region’s politics through a cultural lens wholly different from that of 
white southern conservatives. With a firm grasp of that understanding, and an analysis of the 
rhetoric and imagery used by the campaigns of both Jesse Helms and Jim Hunt during their 
race in 1984, a more complete story emerges. The story is not just one of an Old South racial 
conservative against a New South racial progressive, but rather one of two successful white 
politicians who fought for the white soul of a southern state within the hegemonic culture of 
whiteness.53  
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Chapter Two 
Setting the Tone With Whiteness: April 1983-June 1984 
 
 In September 1983, Jesse Helms told sociologist and North Carolina politician Paul 
Luebke that “the big factor in this election will be whether there will be a balance to the 
efforts of Jesse Jackson, who came into this state earlier this year to meet Governor Hunt and 
then announced that he was going to register, I-forget-what-it-was, 200- or 300-thousand 
blacks for the sole purpose of defeating Jesse Helms.” The conservative senator was up for 
re-election in November of 1984, and Jim Hunt, whose second term was set to expire in 
January 1985, had unofficially thrown his hat into the ring as the prime challenger to Helms’s 
seat. In his political career, Helms had performed extremely well among white voters in the 
state, earning at least 60 percent of the group’s vote in his two previous campaigns. Though 
Hunt received nearly unanimous support from black North Carolina voters, he was also well-
received among the state’s white liberals and moderates, as well as conservative traditional 
Democrats. Those white Democrats proved to be the primary focus of both Helms and Hunt 
during the first six months of 1984. The culture of whiteness within the Tar Heel state’s 
white electorate influenced how both candidates approached the much-needed white 
constituency. Helms solidified his support by continually pointing out the non-white other 
while Hunt attempted to neutralize those charges with a color-blind message of consensus 
politics. When the two successful politicians formally decided to run for the Senate seat, the 
media billed it, as political scientist Tom Eamon noted, the “battle for the soul” of the Tar 
Heel state. However, with the growth of black political activism that largely favored Hunt, it 
was not on the entire electorate that either candidate would place their attention, but on the 
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much-needed votes from white North Carolinians. The 1984 campaign pitted the two men 
against each other in competition for the white soul of North Carolina.1  
Both Helms and Hunt were quite aware of the sensitivities of race that existed within 
North Carolina’s white electorate, and the senator used those emotions to discredit Hunt and 
push the governor into a corner. Hunt, in response, carefully attempted to navigate the 
slippery slope provided by the senator. He worked to weave in color-blind, meritocratic 
conservatism with his moderate progressivism to attract white conservatives, but his tortured 
pragmatism contributed to the lack of integrity in which Helms had effectively framed the 
governor. By doing so, Helms succeeded in doing three things: he highlighted Hunt’s support 
from the black community; by attacking his character and forcing Hunt to wrestle between 
social progressivism and political pragmatism, he tarnished the governor’s own whiteness; 
and he elevated his own whiteness in terms of connecting with the state’s white electorate.2 
The campaign began almost two years before election day in 1984. Early polling data 
showed Jim Hunt leading Helms by twenty-five points in late 1982. Hunt enjoyed high 
approval ratings because of his help in leading the state’s Democratic Party to win several 
elections during the mid-term year. Helms, however, had suffered a political defeat when his 
filibuster against a federal gasoline tax failed. The senator had sunk into a “blue funk” 
according to Carter Wrenn, the executive director of Helms’s National Congressional Club, 
when he learned of the resulting low polling numbers. Helms’s unfavorable rating rose “well 
into the high 30 percent range” and his favorable had sunk to near 40 percent, while Hunt 
																																																								
1 Luebke, Tar Heel Politics, 167, 169; Alexander Lamis, The Two-Party South, 138-139; 
Eamon, The Making of a Southern Democracy, 213. 
2 For an explanation of the evolution of color-blind meritocratic conservatism, see Lassiter, 
The Silent Majority, 231-232. A primary characteristic of one’s individual whiteness is 
integrity, see Dyer, White, 21-22.  
	 47 
enjoyed a favorable rating of close to 70 percent and unfavorable around 20 percent. The 
senator had told his wife Dot that he did not plan to seek reelection and sought to head back 
to North Carolina with her. Tom Ellis, who Hunt’s campaign co-chairman Gary Pearce called 
the “godfather” of Helms’s Congressional Club, pushed Helms toward reelection, and when 
the Club’s pollster Arthur Finkelstein asked that if a “magic wand” could help return Helms 
to his seat, “would he then want to run again,” Helms said, “well, sure I would … I love 
serving in the Senate.” With the senator’s response, Helms’s campaign went to work and 
sought to “resurrect” Helms’s image among North Carolinians while at the same time 
working to, as the Club’s treasurer Mark Stephens recalled, “[transform] Hunt into a liberal 
and a liar.” The battle for the white soul of the Tar Heel state was set to begin and would not 
end until late in the evening of November 6, 1984.3 
The primary strategy of Helms’s campaign sought to portray Helms as a political 
figure with integrity in the Tar Heel state and Hunt as weak and untrustworthy. As Wrenn 
recalled, “moving Hunt’s unfavorable” rating “was really all [the] election was about.” By 
the spring of 1983, the Congressional Club began advertising in 150 newspapers and 
seventy-two radio stations across the Tar Heel state with its appeal to white North 
Carolinians, and the ads, as historian William A. Link noted, “struck hard in issues of race.” 
The radio ads produced by Helms’s campaign ran three times per day throughout North 
Carolina’s rural countryside. A North Carolina journalist estimated that Helms’s opening 
political salvo hit the North Carolina voting public 14,000 times from April to June 1983. 
Coupled with twelve weeks’ worth of advertisements in 150 newspapers, the barrage of ads 
																																																								
3 Christensen, The Paradox of Tar Heel Politics,248; Gary Pearce, Jim Hunt, 128, 148-49; 
Link, Righteous Warrior, 272-273. 
	 48 
cost the Congressional Club nearly $20,000 per week through the spring of 1983, over a year 
and a half before Tar Heels would line up at the voting booth. 4 
The early ads produced by the Club associated Hunt with black civil rights leaders 
and white liberals to sway white conservative opinion of the popular governor. One of the 
ads showed a photo taken of Hunt sitting with African-American civil rights leader Jesse 
Jackson – whose campaign for the top of the Democratic ticket in 1984 “mobilized thousands 
of black voters” – and referenced a 1981 news story that said Hunt wanted to use the State 
Board of Elections to “boost minority voter registration in North Carolina.” The ad 
questioned the propriety of the use of state tax money to increase the number of voters in the 
state, many of whom proved to be black. Another ad showed a photograph of Hunt alongside 
a photo of Massachusetts senator Edward M. Kennedy and Georgia state representative 
Julian Bond. The ad stated that both Kennedy, a white Democrat and liberal, and Bond, a 
black Democrat, civil rights leader, and head of the Black PAC, were “helping Jim Hunt 
defeat Jesse Helms,” although the “Black PAC” did not exist. The ad further claimed that 
The Atlanta Constitution had quoted Bond as saying that his committee wanted to “run a 
picture of Jesse Helms in North Caroline newspapers with a rifle’s crosshair over his chest.” 
Another ad featuring Bond and Kennedy ominously asked, “why do blacPAC and Kennedy 
PAC want to elect Jim Hunt to the U.S. Senate?”5 
Rather than responding to the charges put forth by Helms that tied the governor to 
northern liberals and black political activists, those in the Hunt camp, as Pearce recalled, 
“fought back with the powers of incumbency.” Hunt traveled back and forth across North 
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Carolina as manufacturing plants opened, factories were built, and his political organization 
set roots throughout the state. He spoke to crowds gathered to see him talk about his tough 
stance on crime and his fiscal conservatism, noting that he instituted only one tax increase as 
governor. He noted the wage freeze for the state’s public school educators as an example of 
his ability to stand up to lobbying influence. The governor, Pearce wrote, “was more 
moderate than most national Democrats,” a fact he wanted North Carolina conservatives to 
remember. Hunt had released only two advertisements before the formal start of his 
campaign that attacked the senator for his vote on a bill that “included a doubling of the 
federal cigarette tax” and his “proposal to reform the Social Security system.”6 
By the summer of 1983, Helms continued in his appeal to Tar Heel whiteness through 
increased advertising.  His campaign spent nearly $700,000 on, as Link noted, “3,937 ads in 
167 newspapers, 353 commercials on fifteen TV stations, and 25,542 commercials on one 
hundred radio stations” that sought to characterize Hunt as a liberal as well as link him to 
black political leaders. Most of these advertisements were broadcast and printed throughout 
rural North Carolina among the more conservative portion of the state’s electorate. The 
senator’s strategy had shifted course somewhat with ads that connected Helms with President 
Ronald Reagan, showing the president’s approval of the North Carolina senator. Other ads 
connected Helms with other national Republican figures including Kansas Senator Bob Dole 
and Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker from Tennessee who “testified to Helms’s 
integrity.”7 
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Helms’s campaign continued to gain steam due to the massive fundraising drive of 
his Congressional Club and its revolutionary use of direct-mail fundraising while Hunt’s 
campaign remained quiet. As Link noted, “Helms was better positioned than any other 
senatorial campaign in the country during 1984.” Hunt’s campaign, however, worried about 
getting into an advertising battle too quickly and sought to save as much money as possible 
for the critical last months of the campaign. The governor traveled across the state and the 
country to raise funds for his campaign. On one campaign stop in Asheville, the Hunt 
campaign collected $221,000 in donations from the mountain counties of North Carolina. 
Pearce also recalled an “economic-development trip to California” during the summer of 
1983 that included fundraising events in San Diego and Los Angeles.8  
By the fall of 1983, Helms’s campaign was spending up to $50,000 per week on 
advertising focused on white conservatives, but his biggest boost occurred in early October 
when he proposed to filibuster passage of the bill creating the Martin Luther King Jr. 
Holiday. On October 3, the North Carolina senator gave a speech on the Senate floor 
denouncing the civil rights leader as a radical who believed in “action-oriented Marxism” 
and arguing that those beliefs were “not compatible with the concepts of this country.” 
Though Helms avoided labeling King himself a communist, he claimed in a report submitted 
to the Senate that King “welcomed collaboration with communists” during the civil rights 
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movement. Because of the civil rights leader’s refusal to denounce communism, Helms 
stated that “King harbored a strong sympathy for the Communist Party and its goals.”9 
Helms further claimed that another federal holiday would affect business and offend 
Americans. He objected to the holiday because it would cost $4 to $12 billion in economic 
production. Helms noted moreover that “a national holiday … is or should be an occasion for 
shared values … While Dr. King, in his public image did appeal to many of those shared 
values, his very name remains a source of tension, a deeply troubling symbol of a divided 
society.” Helms continued the theme of King, representing the slain civil rights leader as a 
“troubling symbol,” and stated that “the veneer of religious imagery with which he cloaked 
his political concepts created the very tension which his name still evokes.”10  
Helms, however, failed to find consensus within his own party. Kansas Senator Bob 
Dole, a fellow Republican, questioned Helms’s argument concerning the loss of productivity, 
asking, “since when did a dollar sign take its place atop our moral code?” The Kansas 
Republican further claimed that there was no comparison to the loss of production and 
remembering “the cost of 300 years of slavery followed by a century or more of economic, 
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political and social exclusion and discrimination.” Also, as Link noted, while Helms was 
lambasting the King Holiday bill, Reagan said he would sign it once it passed the Senate, and 
South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond and Majority Leader Baker provided their support 
as well. Regardless of bipartisan support for the bill, Helms stood strong in his convictions 
concerning the holiday bill but relented a day later when he struck a political deal that called 
for “accelerated action on a farm bill containing tobacco reforms” in the Senate that would 
aid North Carolina tobacco farmers in exchange for stopping his filibuster against the King 
holiday. When the press approached the Hunt administration in North Carolina, Gary Pearce, 
at the time Hunt’s press secretary, responded for Hunt that the governor favored the bill and 
that he “[did] not have any comment on what Jesse Helms says or does not say on this.”11 
Notwithstanding the cancellation of his filibuster, Helms continued in his attempt to 
defame King. The senator filed a lawsuit that sought to unseal FBI surveillance tapes of King 
that the Bureau recorded between 1963 and 1968. Helms claimed that it was “imperative” 
that the tapes be released to uncover the “tremendous speculation over the years as to the 
contents of the records generated by the FBI regarding the surveillance of Dr. King” prior to 
any Senate vote on the King holiday bill. The Reagan administration opposed Helms’s 
request and challenged it in court, and the case was dismissed by Judge John Lewis Smith on 
October 18 because he did not want to “interfere in congressional affairs.” On the same day 
Helms gave another speech on the Senate floor and again attempted to connect King with 
communist subversion. He claimed that the American people had a right to know and that the 
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Senate had a “responsibility to know” what connections the civil rights leader had with the 
Communist Party. The Senate, however, under strong objection from Helms, passed the King 
Holiday bill by a margin of seventy-eight to twelve, and Reagan signed the holiday into law 
on November 2. Helms claimed that his stand against the bill was not the result of racist 
sentiment toward King nor any political motivations.12 
As Helms railed against the King holiday, the Hunt campaign was paying close 
attention. Gary Pearce remembered that Hunt and his staff felt a “mixture of fear and fury” 
while they watched Helms’s tirade against the King holiday bill. As it happened, the Hunt 
campaign knew it would become part of the election. Helms immediately used his stand as 
part of a fundraising campaign with a letter that, along with rehashing his thoughts on King, 
said “the left-wing black establishment and the liberals in the news media have branded me a 
‘racist.’ That’s how they smear anyone who disagrees with them.”13 
By November 1983, Helms had begun closing in somewhat on Hunt. The Carolina 
Poll, conducted by the journalism school at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
found that 56 percent of Tar Heel adults polled favored Hunt while 36 percent favored 
Helms, closing the thirty-point gap of a year prior by ten points. Likely voters, however, 
favored Hunt with only a thirteen-point margin, 54 to 31 percent. Families in higher income 
brackets making over $25,000 a year favored the governor 52 to 44 percent, and those of 
lower economic status making less than $15,000 preferred Hunt to Helms 64 to 21 percent. 
Not surprisingly, the poll found that black Tar Heels favored Hunt 87 to 6 percent, but whites 
also preferred the governor by a margin of nine points, 50 to 41 percent. In the Carolina 
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Caravan Poll conducted by Walter DeVries, a pollster living in Wrightsville Beach, voters 
who had voted in 1982 preferred Hunt to Helms by a six-point margin, 47.3 to 41.1 percent.14 
As the Hunt camp and North Carolina Democratic Party saw the governor’s polling 
margins shrinking, the party released a $50,000 radio ad campaign that focused on attacking 
Helms as a “flip-flopper.”15 In February of 1983, Helms submitted the Social Security and 
Individual Retirement Security Act to the Senate to reform drastically the Social Security 
program, and went so far as to give a nearly thirty-minute statewide address on television to 
promote his legislation. In this address, Helms claimed that the system had “hoaxed” those 
paying Social Security payroll taxes, and stated that “there is no trust fund … no vault” that 
held the money collected through those taxes. He further proposed a “private savings system” 
with “individual accounts” that would “supplement” the Social Security “taxation system.” 
The proposed system, according to Helms, would “guarantee, once and for all, the security of 
all elderly Americans.”16 It was on this plan, and Helms’s affirmative vote on a 1982 deficit-
reduction bill that raised the federal tobacco tax, that Hunt’s campaign based its attack. 
Nevertheless, according to Pearce, attempting to portray Helms as a flip-flopper did not 
work.17 
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The Helms campaign responded bitterly and claimed that the ads were false. The 
campaign released a letter drafted by Helms, stating that Hunt’s ads “intentionally distorted 
my record.” The senator prodded the governor, telling him, “Jim, stop trying to hide,” and “it 
isn’t right and it won’t fool the people. Let’s discuss the issues man to man.” He attempted to 
provoke a response from Hunt concerning the King holiday, stating that “not everyone 
agreed with my opposition to the Martin Luther King holiday … but they knew where I 
stood. Where do you stand?” Helms had started challenging Hunt to a debate since the 
beginning of 1983 and continued doing so periodically throughout the year. Hunt responded 
that he “[looked] forward to debating Senator Helms on all the issues facing the people of 
North Carolina, especially the economy, Social Security, and agriculture,” with no response 
to Helms’s provocation concerning the King holiday, but that he would not do so until after 
the Democratic Party primary on May 8.18 
The letter of late November asking the question “where do you stand?” and 
addressing the senator’s stance against the King holiday became the newest advertisements 
released by the senator’s campaign in early December. Rather than focusing on Hunt as a 
liberal, the Helms camp changed its message and began going after Hunt’s integrity. Hunt, as 
Pearce noted, “had a propensity to sound liberal before one group and conservative before 
another.” Though he always sought progress, he shifted back and forth to reach his goals. 
Helms’s campaign sought to illustrate the governor’s pragmatism as flip-flopping. The 
Helms campaign’s primary researcher, Bob Harris, began clipping and reading every article 
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he could find concerning Hunt and his position on issues, and the campaign recorded 
coverage of his public appearances in order to keep track of any positions that might appear 
to change from time to time. Through his research, Harris produced several ad scripts and 
brought them to Tom Ellis and Carter Wrenn.19 
The new ads became effective ten-second television and radio spots. They focused on 
such issues as foreign policy, taxes, budget cuts, and the Martin Luther King Jr. holiday. The 
ads, as Helms recalled, “pointed out the governor’s record of sitting on the fence or 
appearing to take both sides on an issue so he wouldn’t make anybody mad.” At the same 
time the ads showed Hunt as dishonest, they showed Helms as steadfast and principled. In 
response to the new ads, Hunt’s campaign spokeswoman Stephanie Bass noted the 
governor’s stance on school prayer, Social Security, and the governor’s support of the King 
holiday. The governor himself, however, remained silent on the issue with the press.20 
The Helms campaign’s new offensive proved successful, so successful in fact that the 
new strategy remained intact for the remainder of the campaign. What had been a 
comfortable twenty-five-point margin in late 1982 for Hunt had all but disappeared after 
Christmas 1983 when Peter Hart, the governor’s pollster, took his first internal poll since the 
spring. The campaign rolled into the election year with a much closer margin, only three 
points, between the two candidates and there were still eleven month to go.21 
Not long after Helms’s ads challenging, among other things, the governor’s position 
on the King holiday, Hunt attended a fundraiser hosted by the African-American elite from 
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throughout the Tar Heel state in Raleigh. The group of black educators, judges, and political 
figures, including Charlotte mayor-elect Harvey Gantt, provided the Hunt campaign with 
$58,000. The governor noted his broad support for racial equality and vocalized his support 
for the King holiday to the group of black supporters. He further noted that he and nine 
House members from North Carolina supported the holiday because “we know North 
Carolina has climbed upward since we set aside the dead weight of discrimination in this 
country.” Hunt continued and spoke of the need for all North Carolinians to work together so 
that the state could “climb higher” and open “the doors of opportunity to those who in the 
past faced closed doors.” Hunt needed to energize the black community as he saw his white 
support steadily eroding.22 
In January 1984, Helms continued his attack on Hunt’s integrity when he accused the 
governor of using his campaign staff to speak for him rather than disclosing his position on 
issues, referring to those raised in his ads concerning, among other things, the Martin Luther 
King holiday. Hunt responded by evading the issue of the King holiday and pivoted to the 
state’s economy, saying that “a big issue” was “people need jobs,” and that “farmers are in 
trouble.” He pointed out how the federal government had “cut the heck out of the tobacco 
program” which was crucial to North Carolina tobacco farmers, and that “more should be 
done for the elderly and the schools.” “Those,” according to Hunt, “[were] the real problems 
of real people.”23 
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In late January, Hunt attempted to steer attention from the character attacks by Helms 
to his stance on policy and his moderate conservatism. The governor issued his first policy 
position and addressed broad support for Reagan’s foreign policy initiatives, particularly with 
regard to Central America. He sought to take some of the wind out of the Helms campaign’s 
sails when he appeased conservative anti-communist sentiment in North Carolina, stating that 
“Russian attempts to subvert nations … and to assist communist takeovers is something we 
absolutely have to prevent without any question whatsoever.” Rob Christensen noted that the 
governor spoke with a “conservative tone” when Hunt addressed the Chamber of Commerce 
of North Carolina, where he gave his support to Reagan’s decision to invade Grenada and “a 
strong military presence or capability” for regions experiencing destabilization or 
“communist expansion.” He further supported the Reagan administration’s foreign aid policy 
and underlined its importance when he said, “I think we need to give the kind of foreign aid 
that President Reagan has indicated he thinks is necessary.” Hunt did, however, criticize the 
Reagan administration regarding agriculture policy. He claimed that farmers in the Tar Heel 
state continued to suffer “a deep … and growing recession” and that agriculture [was] not 
included in [the] recovery” that the rest of the country was experiencing. He further noted the 
administration’s failure to balance the federal budget, and stated that his objectives fell in 
line with Reagan’s desire to cut wasteful spending, close tax loopholes, and avoid tax 
increases. The governor further noted that regardless of Helms’s political advertisements 
questioning Hunt’s integrity, “I think the people know where I stand.”24 
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When it came time to announce his candidacy officially, the governor chose a place 
of symbolic and strategic importance when it came to the appeal of white Tar Heel 
Democrats, his hometown of Rock Ridge, North Carolina, a small farming community in the 
eastern part of the state. The governor’s campaign kickoff took place at James Baxter Hunt, 
Jr. High School, only five miles from where he was raised. In front of nearly 2,000 political 
supporters who came from all over the state, Hunt, as Daniel Hoover noted, “set the stage for 
a classic political showdown.”25 
During the rally, Hunt delivered a short address that outlined his campaign platform 
and set the tone for the message he would convey to the Tar Heel state’s electorate for the 
next ten months. He spoke about the economy and the need for tax cuts for “working families 
and the middle class,” while insisting that he would close tax loopholes for the wealthy. Hunt 
took subtle jabs at Helms’s record in the Senate, without ever naming the senator, beginning 
each sentence with the phrase “It is time we had a Senator who works for . . . .” He alluded to 
anti-Helms sentiment pertaining to his stance on Social Security, insisting that he wanted to 
“work for an America that offers dignity and independence, not fear – for our parents and 
grandparents.” The governor passively noted Helms’s position concerning civil rights 
legislation and promised to work “to see that equal rights and civil rights are treated as they 
should be – a moral imperative and the law of the land” without any mention of race or skin 
color. He spoke of the need for stronger and higher goals for education, assistance for 
farmers who were suffering due to recession, and environmental protection. Hunt also 
addressed foreign policy issues, noting that he believed in a “strong America” that would be 
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a “force for freedom,” and his willingness to negotiate with foreign adversaries, particularly 
the Soviet Union, to stop global nuclear proliferation. All the issues addressed became 
themes throughout the campaign, but what stood out most was Hunt’s desire to build 
consensus through bipartisanship and the need, as he said, to work “together.” Throughout 
the twenty-minute address, the governor used the color-blind, first-person plural pronouns 
“we,” “us,” and “our” over forty times, further underlining his belief in broad consensus 
politics. 26 
Hunt continued pushing his campaign’s agenda when he held a press conference a 
few days following the launch of his candidacy. He pledged “to get more things done for 
North Carolina in the United States Senate.” While Helms had continued to focus on issues 
such as foreign policy, abortion, school prayer, and the King holiday, Hunt said it was his 
“responsibility to talk about the things that are most crucial” to Tar Heels. North Carolinians, 
said the governor, were “most concerned about their jobs and making enough money to make 
ends meet to provide for their families.” Tar Heel farmers continued living through a 
sluggish economy, and he noted the importance of education and Social Security to the 
state’s citizens. He promised to “work hardest on jobs and opportunities; on having a fair tax 
system where tax cuts go to the working people and the middle class and not just the 
loopholes and tax shelters for the rich.” He also underlined the importance of managing the 
federal deficit and the need for spending cuts in the federal budget.27 
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Not long after announcing his candidacy, Hunt began his television advertising 
campaign with appeals to white North Carolinians. The first advertisements produced 
concentrated on the governor’s ability to communicate effectively and relate to middle- and 
working-class Tar Heels. Hunt spoke about the need “to get things done” in terms of the 
economy, job growth, and technological innovation, as well as improving the state’s 
education system. He continually underlined the necessity of “working together.” With a 
narrator describing Hunt’s accomplishments—including rising reading scores in schools, 
bringing 200,000 new jobs to the state, providing relief for small family farmers, and 
developing programs to bring aid to the state’s elderly—various scenes flooded the television 
screen that showed the governor interacting with various groups of people such as students, 
the elderly, and blue-collar workers, most of whom were white. Hunt spoke on camera about 
his ability to bring “people together” and make all North Carolinians a part of the process to 
make the Tar Heel state a better state for all of its citizens. The slogan at the end of each ad 
was both written on the screen and stated by the narrator: “Jim Hunt for the United States 
Senate. He can do more for North Carolina.”28 
The governor attempted to begin his campaign with a positive focus on the state and 
the economic needs of his constituents. As Stephanie Bass told the News & Observer, the 
Hunt campaign wanted to stress the governor’s political record and “the state’s future, rather 
than criticizing Hunt’s opponent.” Bass continued, “The ads are positive … we think they 
will make our people feel very good about why we are running for the Senate.” The ads, she 
stated, “have a lot of North Carolina people in them,” noting some of the specific groups 
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featured in the ads. The campaign focused, she said, “on concerns and issues of the average 
citizens of North Carolina.”29 
Another series of TV ads from the Hunt campaign focused on specific groups that 
predominantly featured the whiteness of the Tar Heel state. One ad entitled “Working 
People” that featured the working class claimed “these are his people,” and declared that the 
working people of the state needed “someone working for them” in Washington. It continued 
by showing Hunt speaking with a white farmer, telling him that the senator from North 
Carolina is “not the senator from New York or California somewhere” and that the “senator 
from North Carolina ought to stand up for North Carolina products,” taking a passive jab at 
Helms’s out-of-state support. Hunt also alluded to the tax increase on tobacco that Helms had 
supported, and told a group of farmers that they ought to fight the tax increases on their 
products “with everything you’ve got.” In another ad entitled “Farmer,” the screen opened 
with a white male, presumably a farmer, speaking positively about Hunt and continued with a 
narrator describing the governor’s ability to connect with and understand North Carolina 
farmers. Hunt was shown speaking with a group of white farmers and declared that “it’s 
wrong what they’ve done” in reference to federal agricultural policy, which pointed to both 
the negative effects of the policy on the state’s farmers and Helms’s position as chairman of 
the Senate Agricultural Committee. The ad concluded with the narrator declaring that “we 
need that fight in Washington, for our farmers, for North Carolina,” and a short snip of a 
farmer stating, “we need Jim Hunt up there.” Gary Pearce noted that the ads showed that 
Hunt knew the troubles of Tar Heel workers and farmers and that he was more in touch with 
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their interests than Helms, who spent his time in Washington railing on communism and 
“conservative ideological crusades.”30 
By mid-February, according to a poll conducted by North Carolina Opinion Research, 
Inc., Helms had cut Hunt’s lead to within two points. Walter DeVries conducted the poll 
from January 25 until February 5, and noted that Hunt enjoyed a margin of 50.9 percent to 
Helms’s 49.1 percent and did not take into account undecided voters or those who would not 
vote. Tellingly, Hunt lost two percentage points among Democrats polled, falling from 56.8 
percent in an earlier poll to 53.4 percent. Helms received the approval of 72 percent of 
Republicans polled and that of 32.8 percent of Democrats. Helms’s campaign strategy 
targeted specifically to white North Carolinians was working, while Hunt’s message of color-
blind inclusion was not.31  
Helms’s strategy focused on Hunt’s political character continued chipping away at 
traditional Democratic support, and the senator knew it. A four-page letter from Helms’s 
campaign dated February 8 began circulating throughout the state. The fundraising letter 
targeted Jesse Jackson and connected the civil rights leader and candidate in the Democratic 
presidential primary to Hunt. The letter mentioned Jackson by name twenty-four times but 
did not mention Hunt once. As the N & O reported, Helms portrayed “himself as a candidate 
on the political ropes because of Jackson’s efforts to register black voters.” In the letter, 
Helms said that Jackson’s political activism “[had] hit me like a ton of bricks – a 
monumental blow to my campaign.” The senator accused “Jesse Jackson” of instigating “a 
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liberal ‘voter registration drive’ to kick me out of the United States Senate … and then, Jesse 
Jackson met with my opponent – who has just filed his candidacy against me.” Jackson’s 
goal, the letter said, was to register “300,000 more ‘straight ticket’ anti-Helms voters in 
North Carolina.” Helms claimed that black voter registration had increased by 37,000 in 
North Carolina with only a less-than-1 percent increase in conservative registrations. The 
letter concluded with a plea to conservatives to send Helms’s campaign donations to help 
overcome Jackson’s influence in North Carolina. Helms finished by writing, “Without your 
support, conservatives like me wouldn’t even be in the Senate fighting for President Reagan, 
wrestling against Ted Kennedy, or standing up against the budget busting legislation liberals 
like Jesse Jackson [who was not even in the Senate, nor running for a Senate seat] would love 
to pass each day – like the billion-dollar Martin Luther King Holiday.” Included in the 
fundraising mailer was a photo of Jackson by himself, a handbill with a photo of Jackson 
sitting with Hunt, and two quotes from Jackson: “We want it all” and “from the outhouse to 
the courthouse, to the state house, to the white house, March on March on.”32 
The Helms campaign continued its assassination on Hunt’s character with an ad that 
swept the knees of Hunt’s campaign out from under it. At a meeting of the National 
Governor’s Association earlier in February, Hunt supported a measure proposed at the 
conference for a deficit-reduction package comprised of both increased taxes and cuts in 
spending, including both military spending and “a freeze on cost-of-living increases for 
federal employees.” Though he voted for the measure, he declared that he “strongly 
[opposed] any general increase in taxes, which might choke off the current economic 
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recovery.” Helms used Hunt’s perceived flip-flop against the governor in a new ad. The 
senator’s campaign acquired video of the meeting in which the measure was approved and 
caught Hunt raising his hand. With this image of Hunt with his hand raised frozen on the 
screen, the ad stated that Hunt voted to raise taxes. The ad, first broadcast in late February, 
became a staple of the Helms campaign, and wound be shown in various forms and cuts, as 
Gary Pearce recalled, “thousands of times in the months ahead.”33 
The Helms campaign kept with the theme of character assassination. Another ad 
broadcast in March from the Helms campaign showed a clip of Hunt claiming that Helms 
raised most of his campaign funding from out-of-state donors with his well-used line that he 
was not “a senator from New York or California somewhere.” The ad continued with an 
image of an invitation from a fundraiser held for Hunt in New York City and made the claim 
that there was a “New York Committee for Jim Hunt,” contrasting the governor’s image as a 
candidate from North Carolina while he attacked Helms for raising money out of the state. 
The new ads, Carter Wrenn said, “hit Hunt in the character solar plexus.”34 
As Helms continued his attack on Hunt’s character, the governor released his deficit 
reduction plan that underlined the governor’s fiscal conservatism, connected him with 
President Reagan, and sought to attract conservative white Democrats. At a news conference, 
the governor stated that his plan would cut $80 to $100 billion from the federal deficit. 
Hunt’s plan called for the ratification of a constitutional amendment that would require a 
balanced federal budget to be approved by Congress and the president. He also called for a 
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repeal of a portion of Reagan’s tax cut affecting those with yearly incomes of more than 
$50,000, limiting them to $700 in yearly savings while allowing those under that threshold to 
continue saving more. Hunt claimed that the three-year tax cut, as reported by journalist 
Mary Anne Rhyne, “hurt middle-class and working people.” The governor continued his 
swing of conservatism by giving praise to Reagan’s deficit reduction plan, and his campaign 
also stated that the governor was in favor of a constitutional amendment supporting school 
prayer.35 
In response to the earlier Helms ads displaying Hunt’s out-of-state fundraising, the 
governor’s campaign produced a barrage of ads in response to those attacks on his character. 
Rather than making vague inferences to Helms’s misrepresentation of North Carolina’s 
issues, these ads struck directly at the senator. In one ad produced in March entitled “Real 
Issue,” Hunt spoke directly to the camera, stating that, while he was being accused of holding 
out-of-state fundraisers, 75 percent of the money Helms had raised came from “other states.” 
He further challenged Helms to “come out from behind the negative ads and talk about . . .  
the future of North Carolina.” In an attempt to deflect the ongoing character attacks, Hunt 
ended the ad by asking, “where do you stand, Jesse?”36 
Hunt continued touting his moderate, pro-business conservatism in an effort to appeal 
to white conservatives. At a luncheon in Washington, D.C., for political action committees 
that represented trade groups and business, the governor bragged about the industrial 
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development in the Tar Heel state under his administration, and claimed that his 
administration had a record of maintaining balanced budgets in North Carolina. He noted that 
he did not raise any general taxes in the state during the recession of the early 1980s, but 
rather “cut people off the payroll, put in a freeze on salaries, and cut back spending.”37  
The governor continued toeing a conservative line in order to maintain a hold on 
white conservative Democrats in North Carolina through the beginning of April when he 
gave a policy address in which he declared support for Reagan’s rearmament program. Hunt 
stated that he believed “we must move quickly to strengthen out conventional military forces 
and improve their ability to respond when our interests are threatened around the world.” He 
also underlined the need for tough negotiations with the Soviet Union concerning nuclear 
arms control. He took a subtle jab at Helms, declaring “that arms negotiations [were] not a 
sign of weakness. They [were] a sign of sanity.” Hunt supported continued growth of the 
military up to 5 percent, slightly less than Reagan’s proposed 7.5 percent increase, and the 
administration’s desire to expand the Army’s manpower and expand the country’s naval 
armada. The governor rounded out his early spring conservative crusade by touting his tough 
record on crime and claiming that his administration “had helped ‘turn the tide against 
crime’” in the Tar Heel state.38 
Through the winter into spring, Hunt and Helms worked arduously in their attempts 
to attract white conservative North Carolina Democrats to their respective corners. As mid-
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April approached, Walter DeVries released the results of his most recent poll of 623 
registered Democrats throughout the state. Hunt maintained a hold with 52.8, but Helms had 
gained the approval of 37.1 percent of the traditional Democratic Party’s base. DeVries 
claimed that, based on this poll and one he conducted with 200 Republicans, the two 
candidates were “virtually tied, with Helms ahead by 1.8 percentage points,” well within the 
3 percent margin of error. Just days after the News & Observer released the results of 
DeVries’s poll, Helms sent out a mailer to North Carolina Democrats that claimed the 
governor was “too liberal for North Carolina.” The senator’s mailer included a brochure that 
linked Hunt with Minnesota Democrat and Democratic presidential nomination contender 
Walter Mondale and noted the support given to Hunt by organized labor.39 
With the campaign tightening as the calendar passed to May and the Democratic 
primary approaching, Hunt went on the offensive against Helms. Hunt wanted to hold as 
many as ten debates with Helms following the primary election on May 8. Foreshadowing 
his newest campaign advertisements, Hunt declared, “here is a man who has voted against 
our people on the economy . . .  on education . . .  on Social Security . . .  on clean air and 
clean water . . . Everytime [sic] you turn around he’s voted against the people of North 
Carolina.” Hunt continued his offensive in a speech at a Fuquay-Varina tobacco storage 
warehouse where he held Helms responsible for the problems affecting North Carolina 
farmers. He told the crowd of tobacco farmers that when the voters sent him to Washington, 
he would fight for “greater federal support for exporting tobacco and other farm 
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commodities.” He also criticized Helms’s 1982 vote that doubled the federal excise tax on 
cigarettes, which, Hunt claimed, “pushed cigarette sales down 5 percent in 1983.” In a 
position paper released in conjunction with his address, Hunt declared that “farmers have 
seen the most dangerous … collapse of the congressional farm coalition in the twentieth 
century” under Helms’s chairmanship of the Senate Agricultural Committee. He further 
criticized the senator allowance of “nine times more assistance into Illinois than into North 
Carolina” when Helms voted against emergency aid that would help the Tar Heel state’s 
farmers.40 
Following Hunt’s appeal to North Carolina farmers, he broadened his appeal to 
whiteness with a new series of ads, all of which attacked Helms’s voting record in the Senate. 
They focused particularly on Helms’s senate votes that had a negative impact on targeted, 
heavily white, constituencies in North Carolina, such as the elderly, farmers, and the working 
and middle classes. The first ad stated that it was “time to hear the truth” concerning Helms’s 
voting record and that the “fun and games are over.” Hunt had removed his gloves and was 
going after Helms. The other two ads expanded on the theme presented in the first one. In an 
ad entitled “Agriculture,” Hunt declared that “it’s time for Jesse Helms to cut out the 
negative ads and talk about his record.” Painting a negative picture for farming in North 
Carolina during Helms’s tenure as chairman of the Senate Agricultural Committee, Hunt 
stated, with accompanying text on the screen, that 5,000 farmers were out of business in the 
state and other farmers still operating were “deeper in debt.” He then noted the measures 
against which Helms had voted, such as bills supporting agricultural research and funding for 
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disaster loans. The ad concluded with Hunt highlighting Helms’s vote to double the tobacco 
tax and asking, “who’s he fighting for?” The ad “Tax Cuts” opened much the same way, with 
Hunt bringing Helms’s record front and center. Hunt compared the taxes paid, primarily 
between the lower and working classes and the middle and upper-middle classes. He also 
claimed that the tax measures Helms supported would raise taxes on the lower and working 
classes while providing tax breaks for the upper-middle class and wealthy. Hunt stated 
further that Helms voted for “tax loopholes for the wealthy” and “tax breaks for the big oil 
companies.” Ending the ad, Hunt looked into the camera and told voters “when Jesse Helms 
asks for your vote, you ask him if he voted for you.”41 
As Hunt’s ad campaign highlighted the color-blind domestic issues important to 
North Carolinians, the governor went after Helms on foreign policy with regard to what Hunt 
outlined as the senator’s connection with Salvadoran right-wing political figure Roberto 
D’Aubuisson. Hunt claimed that Helms wanted to discredit the election in El Salavador that 
saw the moderate Jose Napoleon Duarte defeat D’Aubuisson. Helms had claimed that the 
United States government attempted to “rig the election.” Hunt jumped at Helms’s criticism 
of the outcome of the election because the Reagan administration had supported Duarte’s 
efforts to win the election. Helms had sent a letter to Reagan asking for the resignation of 
United States ambassador to El Salvador Thomas Pickering prior to the election because the 
senator believed that Pickering tried “to rig the election” against D’Aubuisson. Helms further 
insisted that “the CIA and the State Department tried to bribe officials to give the election to 
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Duarte. Hunt railed against Helms’s connection to D’Aubuisson and his right-wing ARENA 
political party. The Albuquerque Journal had reported earlier that aides to the senator had 
helped establish D’Aubuisson’s political party, ARENA, and Hunt claimed that the party 
“[had] been linked to the right-wing death squads that have murdered thousands of civilians 
in El Salvador.” Helms countered that he did not know of any evidence that linked 
D’Aubuisson to the death squads, saying that “the CIA doesn’t have any evidence, the State 
Department doesn’t have any evidence. Nobody in this city has any evidence.” Hunt 
countered, “there was a great deal of evidence,” ranging from “news accounts, testimony 
before Congress … and a State Department denial of a visa to D’Aubuisson.”42  
Hunt continued to hammer Helms and his claim of rigged elections in El Salvador 
through May into June in an effort to deflect the consistent attacks on his character. 
According to Link, the governor gave interviews and multiple speeches in which he criticized 
the senator’s connection with D’Aubuisson and alleged that Helms was “sabotaging” the 
Reagan administration’s foreign policy.43 The Hunt campaign illustrated the link between 
Helms and D’Aubuisson, as well as other right-wing dictators, in its next series of ads. At the 
end of May, the governor’s campaign produced a television ad that linked Helms to General 
Leopoldo Galtieri of Argentina, Major General Augusto Pinochet of Chile, Prime Minister 
Pieter Willem Botha of South Africa, and D’Aubuisson. The ad accused Helms of backing 
the Argentinians rather than British allies in the Falklands War, setting up D’Aubuisson’s 
political party, and supporting the “right-wing generals in Chile and “racist leaders of South 
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Africa.” While connecting Helms to these men, the ad concluded, “it’s no wonder he’s made 
enemies for North Carolina in the Senate.”44 
In the midst of the attacks on Helms’s domestic and foreign policy positions, the 
senator rehashed the King holiday and Hunt’s connection to black Tar Heel voters as well as 
issuing a stringent denial of the foreign policy implications put forth by the governor’s 
campaign. Prior to a fund-raising dinner in Roanoke Rapids, Helms held a news conference 
where he labeled Hunt a “windshield wiper” because of his movement “back and forth on 
issues,” and opined that the governor was ashamed of his support of the Martin Luther King 
holiday. Helms claimed further that “Jim Hunt knows he won’t be elected unless there is a 
massive turnout of blacks.” With regard to the current campaign discourse concerning his 
response to the Salvadoran election, he stated that he denied the charges of leaking 
information regarding United States involvement. He stated, “I didn’t get one scintilla of 
evidence from the Senate intelligence committee,” and insisted that “in fact, I know more 
about what’s going on there than the committee.”45 
By June, Hunt returned to addressing his domestic policy positions and criticizing 
Helms’s domestic record. In Raleigh at a news conference, Hunt claimed that Helms showed 
a “mean-spirited attitude” with his consistent votes “to weaken” Social Security and 
Medicare. He stated that “once [the elderly] find out what his record has been, I am 
convinced they will say, ‘I don’t want to have a person like that representing me in the 
Senate.’” The governor claimed that some of North Carolina’s elderly could not afford to buy 
																																																								
44	Link, Righteous Warrior, 281; “DHS, Hunt JHSEN-114A ‘Friends,’ JHSEN-114B 
‘Friends,’ JHSEN-115 ‘Yes,’ 5/31/84,” Box 2 in the Video Collection of JBH Papers, NCSU 
Libraries. 
45	“Helms Says Hunt Needs Black Vote,” Raleigh News & Observer, May 19, 1984. 
	 73 
newspapers and that others could not afford to have vision problems corrected, causing them 
to “have trouble keeping up with events in detail.” Hunt cited twelve senate votes Helms had 
cast “against Social Security maintenance.” During the news conference, the governor also 
released a new ad that denounced Helms’s record concerning Social Security and that the 
senator had submitted a plan to “scrap” the program. Hunt further noted the issues of Social 
Security and Medicare in Asheville, and stated that his plan would require hospitals to set 
prices for basic treatments to keep the cost of earned benefits down in order to maintain the 
solvency for the two programs.46 
Hunt continued his domestic policy theme through the first two weeks of June until 
the Helms campaign released an ad that claimed that “North Carolinians pay the highest state 
taxes in the South” and that “state taxes have soared to an all-time record high” under Hunt’s 
administration. The ad concluded with the narrator asking, “how can we afford Jim Hunt in 
Washington?” Two officials in Hunt’s administration denounced the ad. Mark Lynch, the 
state’s Revenue Secretary stated, “this ad paints a totally misleading picture of the tax 
situation in North Carolina” and noted that “the percentage of personal income tax that has 
gone to pay state and local taxes actually declined” during Hunt’s governorship. The ad 
claimed that the state’s yearly revenue “had increased from $2.27 billion to $4.32 billion” 
while Hunt had been in office. Deputy Budget Director Marvin Dorman stated that “it is 
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certainly true that we have experienced an increase in state revenues … but that is primarily 
due to economic growth and inflation; not increases in tax rates.” 47 
With Hunt getting hammered by Helms for state tax revenues, during the last week of 
June his campaign returned to foreign policy, noting Helms’s connection with D’Aubuisson 
and attempting to show the divide between the senator and President Reagan on the issue. 
Hunt, noting a report in the New York Times, claimed that Helms’s accusations of United 
States involvement in the election held in El Salvador “may have endangered the life of the 
U.S. ambassador.” The Times had reported that D’Aubuisson and other ARENA Party 
members had “planned to kill Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering.” Of the news, Hunt said 
that this “[provided] further evidence that Senator Helms has picked the wrong friends in the 
country” and proclaimed that Helms should “come clean about his role in establishing El 
Salvador’s right-wing party.” Helms had reportedly been rebuked by the administration once 
Reagan learned of the assassination plot, but Helms disavowed any such report, claiming that 
he and the president met “at the request” of Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker. Baker, in 
order to quell the notion that Helms had angered the president, noted that the senator and the 
president had “a cordial and agreeable meeting.”48 
In late June, the Hunt campaign produced a new television ad that centered on the 
relationship between Helms and D’Aubuisson and aired while D’Aubuisson was visiting 
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Washington, D.C. The ad opened to black and white photographs of dead women, children, 
and men. As the pictures panned over the television screen, the narrator declared, “this is 
what they do, the death squads of El Salvador” and proclaimed it the murder of “innocent 
men, women, and children.” The ad continued, showing a picture of D’Aubuisson and stating 
that he was “accused” of being responsible for the “death squads.” It then showed a picture 
of Helms with the narrator describing him as D’Aubuisson’s “best friend in Washington.” In 
response to what became known as the “dead bodies ad,” Helms gave a statement live on the 
evening news, stating, “I am just disappointed in the governor. I didn’t think he’d go that 
far.” He told the N& O, “it’s one thing to attack me on Social Security and taxes and school 
prayer. But when Jim Hunt starts involving me with murder, well … I’m just absolutely 
astonished he would stoop that low.” Hunt’s campaign responded through its spokesman 
Will Marshall who said, “It’s disturbing because the reality it shows is disturbing … Senator 
Helms has tried to bury his head in the sand and say that reality doesn’t exist.”49  
Helms’s campaign responded with advertisements of its own that effectively nullified 
the desired effect of the governor’s provocative ad. In the television ad, former Wake County 
Commissioner J.T. Knott declared that he had “been active in the Democratic Party for many 
years” and that he had seen a lot of political advertising. He then proclaimed that Hunt had 
“crossed the line of decency and fair play” and demanded that he apologize to Helms and his 
family.” Another ad questioned Hunt’s integrity, asking “what kind of man … would attempt 
to tie his opponent to murders just to gain political office?” Concluding, the narrator stated 
that Hunt’s ads “tell you more about Jim Hunt than Jesse Helms.” In the end, the “dead 
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bodies ad” lost Hunt the high ground and allowed Helms to question his character, with 
Helms declaring that he “thought better of the governor than that.”50 
With the shock of the dead bodies ad, the first six months of the campaign came to a 
close with another four months to go, but Helms and Hunt had already saturated media 
outlets throughout North Carolina. During the first three months of 1984, the Hunt campaign 
had raised nearly $1.7 million and spent just over $1.5, most of which went to advertising. 
Helms’s campaign raised nearly $2 million in the first three months, totaling $6.4 million 
since 1983 compared to Hunt’s $3.2 million total. Helms spent just over $2 million in the 
first quarter of the year with $867,000 going toward advertising.51 
Helms’s character assassination of Hunt through his campaign’s advertising was 
working. The spring 1984 Carolina Poll showed that the approval of white North Carolinians 
had shifted to Helms by a margin of 12 percent. In October 1983, Hunt had led that 
demographic by 9 percent. Predictably, Hunt maintained the support of black Tar Heel voters 
with a comfortable 86 percent. According to the Carolina Poll, Helms’s emphatic stand 
against the King holiday proved to be the most influential issue for voter behavior behind 
party loyalty. The majority of white North Carolinians did not support the King holiday, and 
Helms was winning that group of white people by 40 points over Hunt. Hunt won the 
approval of 70 percent of Tar Heel whites who supported the holiday, but they only 
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comprised 17 percent of the white population. In the eastern counties of the state, with black 
populations of over 40 percent, Helms held a 30 point margin and a 12 percent margin 
among white voters in counties with low black populations as one moved westward through 
the state.52  
Political scientist Merle Black stated that it was not just the King holiday itself that 
Helms “tapped” with his defiant stand, but “it’s the feeling that’s associated with it . . . the 
feeling of paying too much attention to blacks, that it was unnecessary, that we don’t need 
another holiday.” That same feeling of “paying too much attention to blacks” reemerged 
throughout most of 1983 and the first six months of 1984. Helms repeatedly referred to Jesse 
Jackson in newspaper ads and fundraising mailers. He pointed out the importance of the 
black vote for Hunt. It was not lost on Helms or the North Carolina Republican Party that 
113,575 black Tar Heels added themselves to the state’s voter rolls between October 1982 
and May 1984. The rise of political engagement by black North Carolinians instigated a 
corresponding rise in white registered voters when 142,348 white Tar Heels registered. Rob 
Christensen noted that “on a return slip of one fundraising letter” distributed by Helms’s 
Congressional Club was noted: “Black Power Means Black Rule and Violent Social 
Revolution. VOTE HELMS.” 53  
Though Hunt believed that Helms “was appealing to the worst instincts in some of 
our people,” the governor shied away from the issue of race, and when he did confront the 
issue publicly, the statements were typically weak and wove either racial balance or color-
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blindness into the rhetoric. Just after passage of the King holiday bill, Hunt stated that the 
holiday was “an appropriate way to recognize the contributions of white and black 
Americans in the cause of equal opportunity.” He attempted to appeal to the racial sensitivity 
within the state’s electorate without alienating too much of the white Tar Heel vote. His 
campaign so far had focused on what he called “real issues”: agriculture, low taxes, fiscal 
responsibility, Social Security, Medicare, crime, and a strong foreign policy that would 
hopefully appease white southern conservative Democrats.54  
From the beginning of the campaign, Helms used imagery, rhetoric, and the divisive 
symbols of the Civil Rights Movement, including its assassinated leader Martin Luther King 
Jr. and contemporary political figure Jesse Jackson, to curry favor with white conservative 
voters. Not only did the senator use them, he tied them directly to Hunt to illuminate the 
governor’s connection with the state’s black community.  In order to maintain the fragile 
coalition through which Hunt had ascended politically, the governor rarely addressed the 
connection directly, and when he did, it was often done in front of audiences composed of 
black Tar Heels. Rather than focusing on the issue with white Tar Heels, he emphasized the 
state’s economy, foreign policy, taxes, and Social Security. The poll numbers showed that 
while Helms’s strategy was succeeding, Hunt’s strategy was failing. The senator had 
effectively tarnished the governor’s whiteness and tied him to the black community in North 
Carolina, and white voters responded favorably to Helms’s message. If Hunt wanted to keep 
the campaign competitive, he needed to tack another course for the last months of the 
campaign, and he needed to do it fast. 
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Chapter Three 
Culture Wars and the Expansion of Whiteness: July-November 1984 
 
At a fund-raising dinner in the eastern North Carolina town of Henderson in 
September 1983, Jesse Helms told those attending that “every pressure group known to man 
is converging on North Carolina, and they’re forthright in saying that their number one goal 
is to eliminate me from the Senate.” Helms had been a long-time leader of the conservative 
backlash against the rise of the gay rights movement as well as a stalwart opponent of the 
women’s liberation movement, both of which gained steam going into the 1970s following 
the success of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. He was adamant in his support of the 
rights of employers and vehemently opposed to organized labor. As William Link noted, 
“Helms’s conservatism was defined in reaction to the tumultuous 1960s: he resisted the 
sexual revolution, opposed feminism and the Equal Rights Amendment, and championed 
old-fashioned morality against the American counterculture.” The senator wove the issues of 
homosexuality, women’s rights, and race together, all of which threatened the traditional 
values of southern whiteness, into his campaign during the last four months, reinvigorating 
his divisive use of whiteness to maintain his appeal among white conservative North 
Carolinians.1 
 Jim Hunt represented the modern southern Democrat. He embodied what political 
scientist V.O. Key called the “Progressive Plutocracy” that North Carolina had become 
during the twentieth century. He built coalitions made up of business executives, white racial 
moderates, liberals, black voters, and white traditional Democrats.  Paul Luebke wrote that 
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the governor was one of the “prime promoters of modernizer ideology” during his first eight 
years as governor leading up to 1984. As Gary Pearce carefully noted, the governor was “the 
dominant progressive leader of his time.” He pushed for the North Carolina General 
Assembly to pass the Equal Rights Amendment for ratification through the 1970s and early 
1980s. He was the first North Carolina governor to appoint a black judge to the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals and the North Carolina Superior Court. The governor also 
supported the right for a woman to abort her pregnancy, going so far as to support the 
coverage of abortions by Medicaid. The progress espoused by Hunt had limits however. He 
defended labor unions but also backed North Carolina’s right-to-work laws that protected 
business interests and, by 1984, had little to say concerning homosexuality, the sexual 
revolution, or the ensuing culture wars that came out of the 1970s. Social liberalism alienated 
much of the North Carolina electorate, and Hunt knew it. He had to tread a narrow path 
between tradition and progress with his inclusionary politics in order to keep from alienating 
the traditional base of his party, North Carolina whites.2 
 Through June 1984, Helms’s strategy sought to discredit Hunt by portraying the 
governor as a politician who lacked integrity. Helms’s character assassination highlighted 
Hunt’s perceivably shifting policy stances on taxes, defense spending, and foreign policy, 
while at the same time maintaining the connection between the governor and black political 
activists, such as Martin Luther King and Jesse Jackson. The strategy proved effective, and 
white conservative Democrats had begun abandoning Hunt in favor of Helms. In the spring, 
the Carolina Poll discovered that Hunt’s support among white Tar Heel voters had dropped 
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from a positive margin of 9 percent to falling behind Helms by a margin of 12 percent. The 
Hunt campaign could not agree on a clear message that would nullify Helms’s effective use 
of race and character assassination. With the governor’s camp unable to connect with white 
voters effectively, the senator’s campaign worked hard to further its message through the last 
four months of the campaign.  that included an increased barrage of advertisements, four 
debates televised on statewide television, and his vision of whiteness in the Tar Heel state 
that contrasted with Hunt’s: an exclusionary divisiveness based on traditional cultural 
attitudes held by white conservatives versus a color-blind and culturally-vague message of 
inclusive progress.3 
 While the Hunt campaign wrestled with how to appeal to white North Carolinians, the 
Helms campaign and the Republican Party enjoyed the fruits of labor provided by the Moral 
Majority and other evangelical groups that sought to increase the participation of white 
conservative Christians in the political process. As political scientists Lyman A. Kellstadt 
and James L. Guth have noted, the Republican Party traditionally had appealed to “mainline 
Protestant churches, such as Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and Methodists.” Democrats, in 
contrast, “spoke for religious minorities: Catholics, Jews, and evangelical Protestants,” 
particularly in the traditional South. Kellstadt and Guth, however, noted that by the 1980s, 
Christian voting behavior “had shifted, as Mainline Protestants dwindled in number, 
Evangelicals moved toward the GOP, the ancient Catholic-Democratic alliance frayed, and 
Black Protestants became a critical Democratic bloc.” This change in voting behavior gave 
Hunt a solid block of support from black Tar Heel Christians and those who followed the call 
																																																								
3 Mike McLaughlin, “King Holiday and Hunt-Helms Race,” Raleigh News & Observer, June 
24, 1984. 
	 82 
of Jesse Jackson for increased black voter participation. At the same time however, Helms 
received crucial support from white evangelicals of whom the Moral Majority enlisted over 
140,000 to register to vote by the end of May.4 
 White evangelicals proved to be the audience toward which Helms aimed the 
message of his campaign from July to November 6. Though historians Michelle Nickerson 
and Darren Dochuk have noted that the evangelical “born-again” movement included a cross-
section of races and ethnicities in the Sunbelt South of the United States, there have 
remained, according to sociologists Michael Emerson and Christian Smith, divisive racial 
attitudes among white Christian conservatives. These divisions have remained within the 
evangelical movement according to Emerson and Smith because white evangelicals have 
failed to see the structural racial inequality within American society. This failure to notice 
institutional whiteness has “[increased] the divide between white and black Americans” 
because of the “free-will individualist tradition” that negates the influence of man-made 
institutions on individuals. This born-again movement among white evangelicals adopted the 
heavily conservative color-blind ethos of smaller government, low taxes, free markets, 
defense spending, and a classless vision of meritocratic individualism, all important elements 
of the culture of whiteness.5 
With an influx of white evangelical political activism, homosexuality proved to be 
one of the more damning issues Helms and his supporters used to energize the tide of 
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conservative whiteness that was rising against Hunt. The debate on gay rights had existed 
only on the fringes of the Hunt-Helms campaign prior to the summer. By June however, the 
Helms campaign began working to tie Hunt to the homosexual community. Helms began 
weaving the connection into his news conferences, speeches, and printed newspaper 
advertisements, making the claim that Hunt accepted funds contributed by gay advocacy 
groups. In response to the claims, the Hunt campaign stated that it refused to take in 
contributions from homosexual advocacy groups, but did not know the sexual orientation of 
individual contributors. This response became the standard response as the Helms campaign 
hurled the accusation at Hunt for the remainder of the campaign.6 
 On July 5, a Helms proxy helped bring the issue of homosexuality to the forefront of 
the campaign. The Landmark, a small local newspaper in Orange County that had not existed 
before the 1984 campaign, published an article that brought homosexuality to the front page 
of the News and Observer’s coverage. The paper’s editor, Bob Windsor, published an article 
entitled “Jim Hunt is Sissy, Prissy, Girlish and Effeminate.” He claimed that Hunt “had a 
lover who was a pretty young boy from North Carolina” and a “girl friend in his office,” who 
“was a former high-priced call girl used by the banks and big companies in Winston-Salem 
to entertain their guests.” In the article, Windsor asked “Is Jim Hunt homosexual? Is Jim 
Hunt bisexual?” and “has he kept a dark secret in his political closet all of his adult life?” The 
article further alleged that the Hunt campaign had received contributions from gay advocacy 
groups and that “it [was] that dirty money that is spreading lies and distortions about Jesse 
Helms on your television screen this very minute.” Prior to the July 5 article written by 
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Windsor, The Landmark had published several articles connecting either Hunt or the state’s 
Democratic Party to homosexuals, including those entitled “Jim Hunt Received 
Contributions from Gay Activists,” “Jim Hunt Visits Limp Wrist Set Fund Raiser in N.Y.,” 
and “Faggots Dominate Fourth Congressional District Convention.”7 
Both Hunt and Helms denounced the article. As Gary Pearce recalled, Hunt was 
“knocked off stride by the charge,” but the governor stated that he was “going to file suit 
unless these people fully retract and apologize for what they’ve done.” He claimed further 
that the Helms campaign was irrefutably connected with The Landmark. Hunt’s office sent a 
registered letter to Windsor that demanded a full retraction of the article within ten days of 
the letter’s receipt. The Hunt campaign’s legal counsel, former North Carolina Supreme 
Court Judge J. Phil Carlton, stated that “we expect an apology and a retraction,” and further 
noted: “what [Windsor] does won’t preclude a lawsuit, but his failure to do anything will 
assure a suit.”8 
 When Helms learned of the article and Hunt’s charge of a connection with his 
campaign, he stated, “I had nothing to do, nor did I have any knowledge of, the newspaper 
article.” He released a statement to the press and noted his “deep and abiding sympathy for 
the governor and his family in the wake” of Windsor’s article. He strongly believed 
“Governor Hunt to be, personally, a moral family man,” and he shunned any challenge of 
Hunt’s personal principles. “Any suggestion to the contrary,” Helms wrote, “is repugnant and 
unfair.” He also hoped that the remainder of the campaign would focus on the real issues 
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facing the country, including the Cold War and continued economic growth fueled by 
capitalism.9 
Following the criticism received from both candidates, Windsor apologized, but not 
before giving another 1,500 copies out at the Legislative Building in Raleigh, selling 
thousands of copies to the state Republican Party, and bragging about the popularity of the 
article and the possibility of printing another 20,000 copies. Windsor relented in a press 
conference, stating that he was “dead wrong” to publish the story and that “I humbly and 
sincerely apologize to the governor.” He emphasized that no one influenced his motives in 
writing the story. During his apology, he noted that he had voted for Hunt in all three of the 
statewide races of which he had been a part and for Helms in his previous two Senate races. 
He also endorsed Helms as “a man I much admire and respect.”10  
With homosexuality thrust into the campaign, the candidates carefully responded to 
Windsor’s apology. When the press asked Helms if he accepted Windsor’s support, the 
senator stated that he “would welcome the support of anybody,” and that he “disavowed only 
the deed, not the doer and his methods.” In response to Windsor’s apology, Hunt stated that 
he was “glad he . . . apologized,” but did not rule out the possibility of a lawsuit against The 
Landmark publisher. Even with the apology, however, Windsor claimed to have sold 12,000 
copies of the paper to the chairman of the state Republican Party, David Flaherty. The state 
GOP chairman bought the extra copies to have them distributed throughout North Carolina 
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to, he said, “turn the race on issues that would play strong and get people’s adrenaline 
going.” Flaherty noted that Republicans sought to connect Hunt not only to black activism 
but to “gay rights, and that was our focus.”11 
Though both Helms and executive director of the National Congressional Club Carter 
Wrenn noted that there was no connection between Bob Windsor and the Helms campaign, 
the article in The Landmark helped establish a theme of the perils of homosexuality in North 
Carolina and their connection to both the Democratic Party and Jim Hunt. The issue of gay 
rights promoted by liberals threatened the security of whiteness felt within the state’s white 
conservative population. With this threat, Helms’s campaign, the state Republican Party, and 
supporters of both seized on the moment to address broader cultural issues that helped 
continue the growth of political participation of white evangelical Christian 
fundamentalists.12  
In an effort to alleviate charges against him, Hunt called on the national Democratic 
Party not to “get into every demand of every single special-interest group” in the country” 
and claimed that the “Democratic Party [had] gone too far in trying to promise everything to 
everybody.” He suggested that Democrats needed a platform that would not alienate the 
white voters that southern Democrats needed to win their elections. The national party’s 
platform, Hunt said, needed to attract “working people and moderate mainstream people,” 
ostensibly referring to the working and middle classes consisting primarily of straight white 
centrist voters. These white moderates sought by Hunt and other southern Democrats could 
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minimize the gains made among white southern conservatives by Helms and other 
Republicans.13 
 The national party seemingly responded to Hunt’s request and, according to The New 
York Times, “moved away from some hallmarks of its tradition of liberalism” when the 
Democrats announced their national platform at the national Democratic nominating 
convention. The new platform included policies that would help poor people find ways of 
supporting themselves without mentioning the words “welfare reform.” Democrats also 
suggested a firmer, more conservative stance concerning the Soviet Union than it had in 
previous election years, and made only a vague reference “to reduce the rate of increase in 
defense spending” with no specific cost estimates. The party also hardened the Democratic 
position concerning the criminality of drug use and its support for the war on drugs. 
According to the Times, however, the party “bolstered support for abortion and homosexual 
rights,” two issues that alienated the new evangelical voters in North Carolina.14 
The Helms campaign jumped at the opportunity to exploit the national Democratic 
position to weaken white Christian support for Hunt. In a letter distributed by the Helms re-
election committee in mid-August, ministers were strongly encouraged to back Helms and to 
begin registering congregants to vote following church services. In the letter that included the 
signatures of four popular Baptist ministers in the state, Helms was described as “a man who 
believes in traditional family values and morality.” It continued, “every ultra-liberal 
organization – NOW (National Organization for Women), the national union bosses and even 
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[the] homosexual community – has targeted Sen. Helms for defeat,” urging that 
“conservative-minded Christians must fight back.”15 
Sustaining the drive to instigate the participation of white evangelicals, the thrust of 
moral Christian conservatism continued with two fundraising letters circulated by the Helms 
campaign. One letter, signed by entertainer Pat Boone, repeated the same themes, noting that 
the same “liberal groups” noted above were out “to destroy Jesse.” It noted that Helms fought 
“to do God’s will” and that “you and I need Jesse in Washington. America needs him,” and 
“God needs him.” When the press asked Helms’s campaign press secretary Claude Allen 
about the letter, he replied that Helms “just [wanted] to see morality back in politics.” The 
second letter, signed by Helms, claimed that the senator “encountered the wrath of almost 
every liberal and welfare organization in this country.” Liberal groups that included “ruthless 
union bosses, abortionists, pornographers, homosexuals, and biased news commentators … 
[wanted] nothing more than to ‘Get Jesse Helms.’” Helms implored supporters to donate 
money so he could combat advertisements paid for by these groups. The campaign also 
needed cash to combat Jesse Jackson’s addition of “250,000 new straight ticket, black 
voters.”16 
The two letters never named Hunt nor referred to him in any way, but the implication 
that the governor received support from these groups was clear. Following an endorsement 
by Pastors for Helms, a newly formed organization of 220 pastors, Steve Sells, a North 
Carolina pastor, claimed that Hunt defended “special privileges for homosexuals” and that 
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both the governor and Democratic presidential candidate Walter Mondale “have … gone on 
record as promoting a collective type of right for homosexuals to the point of making them a 
legitimate minority.” Sells also praised Helms’s position concerning “voluntary prayer in 
public schools,” neglecting the fact that Hunt had supported passage and ratification of an 
amendment allowing for the same earlier in 1984. Hunt’s campaign press secretary Will 
Marshall responded that what Sells had said was “typical Helms misinformation” and 
highlighted the governor’s support of school prayer on a voluntary basis. He evaded the 
accusation of the governor’s support of homosexuals, however, stating that the charge was “a 
smear campaign” against the governor and insisting that the senator was “engaging in 
personal attacks” that attempted to undercut Hunt’s desire “to help the people of North 
Carolina and the United States” as United States senator.17 
In October, another set of letters surfaced that kept homosexuality and Christian 
evangelicalism within the focus of the campaign. The first letter, distributed by the group 
Southern Christians for Helms, appeared throughout the Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill 
Triangle area, proclaiming that “homosexuality” was a “filthy sin” that was “devouring the 
minds and bodies of our young people.” It also claimed that “this sin is the most despicable 
perversion mentioned in all the annals of history.” The letter stated that “no Christian … is 
permitted to even tolerate its existence, much less make excuses for it and pretend it doesn’t 
exist.” It also claimed that Coy Privette, a prominent Baptist minister in North Carolina, had 
“recently called Sen. Helms one of God’s Anointed [sic].” The signature on the letter 
belonged to a Rev. Harvey J. Doster III. The News & Observer reported, however, that it 
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attempted to track down Doster for comment but could not find any proof of his existence. 
Allen, Helms’s campaign press secretary, emphatically denied any connection between the 
letter and the senator’s campaign, calling it “tasteless” and raising the possibility that it was a 
“dirty trick or prank by someone opposed to Senator Helms.” When asked about the quote 
attributed to him in the letter, Privette stated that he had “absolutely never heard” of the 
letter’s author.18 
 The second letter from the same group surfaced on the campus of The University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill but was signed by another fictitious minister, Rev. M. 
Maynard Wilkes. The writer of letter, like the other, railed against homosexuality and 
promised to name homosexuals on campus. The president of the University, William C. 
Friday, submitted the letter to the State Bureau of Investigation, which failed to find a pastor 
by that name, and called it “series of vile, vulgar and abusive statements intended to induce 
fear and harass people.” Allen stated, as he had with the first letter, “we strongly denounce 
everything in that letter,” and again raised the possibility that it was a “hoax designed to 
embarrass and hurt the Helms organization.” As historian Link noted however, “many 
suspected that” both “letters came from the Helms campaign.”19 
Though Hunt never came out specifically in support of gay rights during the 
campaign, Helms succeeded in linking the governor with homosexuals through Hunt’s 
membership in the Democratic Party. Neither candidate, it seemed, wanted anything to do 
with the state’s gay community. White evangelicals responded favorably to the senator’s 
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moral compass and his stand against “militant homosexuals” even though Hunt never 
advocated for gays in his public addresses or in his campaign’s advertising. Following their 
vitriolic denouncement of Bob Windsor’s article in The Landmark, the North Carolina 
Human Rights Fund released a letter that reprimanded both Helms and Hunt for their 
attitudes toward the gay community. The letter from the gay advocacy group stated, “it [was] 
unfortunate that both . . . campaign organizations have reacted to the fact that . . .  Windsor’s 
allegations are untrue.” The letter continued by noting that though “it [was] not negative to 
be gay . . .  both candidates refer[red] to their feelings as though this were a negative thing.” 
Leo J. Teachout, a member of the Fund stated that “gay people should not be the brunt of this 
type of stereotyping by . . .  Governor Hunt or Jesse Helms.” The Helms campaign, 
according to Allen, took the statement “as an attack on the senator,” while Stephanie Bass, 
communications director for Hunt’s campaign, said that the governor “had no comment” on 
the letter and clarified that he “had not heard of the group before.”20 
In another incident involving homosexuals and the campaign, The Front Page, a gay 
advocacy periodical based in Raleigh and distributed throughout North and South Carolina, 
published an article charging that there were conservative gay men who supported Helms 
regardless of his stand against gay rights. When asked about the possibility, Allen stated that 
“the whole concept . . . [was] about as ridiculous as The News & Observer endorsing Helms.” 
He claimed further that “it was a hoax . . . designed to help Governor Hunt in his election 
bid” and highlighted that “anybody who watched the Democratic Convention would know 
where the homosexual community stands.” Helms had benefited greatly from its portrayal of 
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Hunt linked with homosexuals. One insider close to Helms’s campaign told David Flaherty, 
the state GOP chair, that “every damn time you hit those homos,” the senator’s poll numbers 
rose.21 
The escalation of gay rights activism threatened conservative family values and the 
culture of whiteness within which those values were established. Not only did Helms and his 
supporters use homosexuality to persuade white evangelical Christians to become more 
political active, but the issue provided a way for Helms to expand the scope of the Senate 
race in North Carolina. Other conservative cultural issues important to the national GOP, 
including pornography, school prayer, and abortion, threatened the purity of whiteness and 
the security of the United States. With that in mind, the senator became increasingly more 
persistent in linking Hunt to the national Democratic Party and himself to the national 
Republican Party and its standard bearer Ronald Reagan.22 
 At a speech given at Northside Baptist Church in Charlotte, Helms addressed the 
3,500-member congregation and reminded them that there was a “cacophony of voices” 
coming from politicians, entertainers, and the news media that “[blocked] the very moral and 
spiritual base from which America grew to greatness.” He charged that within American 
politics, “there [were] . . . compromisers” who were “responsible for the deliberate 
destruction of one-and-a-half million of the most innocent, most helpless human beings 
imaginable – the unborn.” Helms believed that Reagan, whom he called a “decent and 
honorable president,” was disparaged because he felt that the country had to re-establish its 
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Christian foundation to continue as, quoting the Pledge of Allegiance, “one nation, under 
God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.” The president, according to Helms, was 
“under constant attack because he has dared to warn about the threat of godless atheism” and 
communism, “which [was] spreading its bloody hand around the world, including our own 
hemisphere.” The senator continued, stating that 1984 was “the year … when God-fearing 
Americans [could] assure the restoration of their freedom and make secure once again the 
faith of our fathers.”23 
Ronald Reagan, having been used by both Helms and Hunt during the first months of 
their campaigns to curry favor among white voters, took an increasingly prominent position 
in the senator’s message to the white Tar Heel electorate as the Republican president led 
Walter Mondale by large margins throughout the South. In a Helms television advertisement 
released in August that featured only Reagan, the president noted Helms’s strength of 
character as a “senator we can always count on to stand up for his beliefs,” and declared his 
“courage on tough issues is an inspiration to all Americans.” Reagan stated that he 
“[cherished his] friendship with Jesse” and required the senator’s “honesty and … outspoken 
patriotism … in the United States Senate.” 24 
As Helms brought the national campaign into the Senate race in North Carolina, Hunt 
attempted to distance himself as much as possible from the national Democratic Party, 
particularly the party’s presidential nominee Walter Mondale. During his acceptance speech 
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at the Democratic convention, Mondale unabashedly stated that “Mr. Reagan will raise taxes, 
and so will I. He won’t tell you. I just did.” Gary Pearce stood on the floor at the convention 
during Mondale’s speech and questioned if he had “[heard] that right?” Hunt recalled to 
Pearce years later that when he heard Mondale promise to raise taxes, he had two reactions. 
The first was “that was clever,” but a moment later he realized the political implications and 
said to himself, “oh, hell.” He knew what was coming.25 
The linking of Hunt to Mondale, particularly with regard to taxes and free-enterprise, 
and the national Democratic Party’s support of the African-American civil rights, women’s 
rights, and gay rights movements, continued as a theme of his advertising during the last 
months of the campaign. The senator highlighted the connection during the second, third, and 
fourth debates, that “Mr. Hunt doesn’t want you to know it, but he’s a Mondale liberal and 
ashamed of it … I’m a Reagan conservative and proud of it.” The senator used some form of 
the phrase in nearly every television advertisement from the Democratic convention until the 
end of the campaign, as well as in most of his debates. As Pearce remembered, “the ads were 
so pervasive that the young daughter of one supporter thought Hunt’s first name was 
Mondale.”26 
The governor attempted to separate the campaign in North Carolina from the 
narrative Helms had begun to construct. He focused on matters—as he noted in their second 
debate—that “put people first,” referring to issues such as education and the state’s economy, 
particularly the textile and tobacco industries, Social Security, and tax cuts for the working 
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and middle classes, rather than the cultural issues Helms had begun raising. He also 
continued to emphasize his fiscal conservatism and noted that under his administration North 
Carolina had a balanced budget and proved that it was possible to “have both a fiscally . . . 
and a fair and caring government.”27 
Hunt’s effort to counter the charges brought forth by Helms that linked the governor 
to the national Democratic Party became a recurring theme in his television advertising. To 
attract white moderates, he portrayed himself as a southern Democrat with a fiscally 
conservative philosophy while at the same time portraying North Carolina as a state of 
“progress” while avoiding any mention of cultural issues. Television advertising began in 
July that featured Hunt on the North Carolina coast at Kitty Hawk, sitting on the front porch 
of a home in a white-picket-fenced neighborhood with an American flag waving behind him, 
and standing before a farmhouse with a white picket fence surrounding a pasture in the 
background. In the ads, the governor noted that the “American dream” had started in North 
Carolina with English colonization and then declared that it was the responsibility of each 
generation to “pass on a better America to each new generation.” With better schools, an 
advanced technological industry, and old-fashioned hard work, the Tar Heel state would 
continue, Hunt stated, to “set an example” that would lead the country. The southern 
Democrat also referred to the necessity of “freedom, justice, opportunity, [and] free 
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enterprise,” while passively alluding to Helms’s positions on foreign policy, maintaining the 
charge that the United States should not support “ruthless dictators or political terrorists.”28 
Hunt also introduced a popular celebrity familiar to white North Carolinians to 
emphasize the difference between him and the image of the national Democratic Party drawn 
by Helms. In three advertisements produced by the campaign, the former fictional sheriff of 
Mayberry, Andy Griffith, emphasized the necessity of a Hunt victory in November. In the 
ads, Griffith reminisced on the greatness of North Carolina, noting the rural beauty of the 
state, the “hard-working people,” and the state’s “progressive attitude.” The actor spoke 
favorably of the governor, pointing out Hunt’s sensibility, his commitment to family values, 
and his fiscal conservatism. In one of the ads, Griffith asked, “do you know what a North 
Carolina Democrat is?” Answering the question for voters, he stated, “it’s somebody that 
sometimes votes Democratic and sometimes votes Republican, but always votes [for the] 
best man.” He characterized Hunt as “tough” and stressed the governor’s fiscal conservatism, 
pointing out that “he knows how to squeeze a quarter ‘til an eagle squawks.” With children 
playing, pastureland, and farmhouses in the background, the ads represented the rural and 
simple character of the state. The ads reinforced the notion that the governor identified with 
such traditional qualities and juxtaposed those characteristics with the moderate progress 
Hunt sought to represent.29 
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Within the progressive narrative the governor’s campaign wove, Hunt emphasized the 
need for education and self-sufficiency, as well as his role to help develop the state into a 
technologically-driven economy, all within the context of whiteness. In an ad that targeted 
working class white men, photographs portrayed a white working-class male as he went 
about his day on the job and ended with him spending time with his wife and young son in 
and around their modest home. The commentary focused on education as the way for North 
Carolina workers to keep up with technological and industrial innovation. The governor 
proclaimed, “progress . . . it’s North Carolina,” and insisted that rather than waiting for it, 
one must “work to shape it.” He addressed his record in this regard, stating that he worked 
“so hard” to attract new jobs and bring innovation to the state for “a better future.”30 
While he wove together his narrative of North Carolina progress, Hunt wanted to 
drive a wedge between his opponent and moderate conservatives in the Republican Party. He 
countered Helms’s emphasis on religious issues by portraying the senator as a leader of the 
“radical right.” At a news conference, the governor declared that he had “talked to some 
good conservatives who don’t think [Helms is] a very good one.” As campaign strategist J. 
Phil Carlton said, the strategy of linking Helms with the radical right sought to put side by 
side “Jim Hunt’s solid record and show Jesse Helms’ extreme record.”31 
Helms, in response, continued to double-down on his connection with Reagan as well 
as other prominent Republicans in the federal government. He also tried to link himself to 
North Carolina’s popular former Democratic senator Sam Ervin. In an advertisement 
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produced by Helms’s campaign, President Reagan was giving a speech at dinner celebrating 
Helms in which he quoted Ervin as saying that Helms had the “courage to stand up for what 
he honestly believes.” The narrator continued: “on June sixteenth, in our nation’s capital, the 
President of the United States, the majority leader of the Senate . . . 33 prominent senators, 
and over 700 leaders of business and public affairs honored a respected North Carolinian, 
Senator Jesse Helms.” The scene then cut to notable conservative politicians such as Senate 
Majority Leader Howard Baker, Congressman Jack Kemp, and Vice President George H.W. 
Bush who all gave praise to Helms and his indispensability as the senior senator from North 
Carolina. The ad continued with Reagan reassuring Helms that the senator had all the support 
he needed and that they would all march with him to victory on election day. With an image 
of Helms and Reagan sitting together in the Oval Office, the narrator concluded: “respected 
leadership: Senator Jesse Helms.” The senator not only included nationally-recognized 
Republicans in his advertising, but he had GOP office holders in the federal government 
come to North Carolina and speak on his behalf.32 
Regardless of the party endorsements Helms received, Hunt continued to portray 
Helms as out of touch with North Carolina constituents (particularly the elderly) and Ronald 
Reagan. He tried to lessen Helms’s appeal to moderate white voters by connecting the 
senator with notable right-wing conservative figures such as Jerry Falwell, Phyllis Schlafly, 
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and Nelson Bunker Hunt. Hunt claimed in a television ad that the right-wing conservatism 
that Helms espoused sought to “push [its] views on religion into our public schools and into 
your public life.” He attempted to distinguish the right-wing ideology Helms advocated from 
the mainstream conservative appeal of Ronald Reagan, but the already effective message that 
Helms championed the principles of whiteness held dear by white conservative Tar Heels 
had helped establish a solid link between himself and the president.33 
As the campaign between Helms and Hunt progressed, Social Security became a 
major attack issue for both as older North Carolina voters split evenly in their preference for 
the candidates. The governor’s campaign alone, as Link noted, “produced some eight 
different ads about” the program. In one of those ads, the governor attacked Helms’s 
position, claiming that Helms had “voted against Social Security again and again, even 
against the minimum Social Security benefits,” and “against President Reagan’s plan to 
rescue Social Security.” At a press conference, Hunt further declared, reflecting his 
campaign’s advertisements, that since his days as a television editorialist, Helms had labeled 
Social Security as “disguised welfare,” and insisted that his voting behavior in the Senate 
showed that he “has been a consistent and predictable foe of Social Security and 
Medicare.”34  
Helms deflected the claims made by Hunt regarding his position on Social Security. 
In one television ad, the senator claimed that it was his “moral duty” to see that “no 
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American suffers alone,” and that he was honest when he said that he would work to 
“strengthen Social Security.” He further noted that the same “sound solutions” that had 
reversed inflation and “revitalized America’s economy” would keep the program solvent, and 
that the Social Security system would be “guarantee[d].” In a public address, the senator 
declared that Democrats used Social Security for “partisan purposes.” In a fund-raising letter 
addressed to elderly voters, Helms wrote that Hunt supported the reduction of benefits for 
citizens “born after 1938 and [opposed] a guarantee of Social Security benefits.” Hunt replied 
that the senator’s charges were “sheer bunk” and further noted that he “stood with President 
Reagan and the great majority of Congress to save” the program while Helms “was voting 
not to save it.”35 
With an increase in political activism among women through the 1970s into the 
1980s, women had become an important constituency for both Helms and Hunt. As polling 
numbers remained tight between the candidates after Labor Day, both candidates broadened 
their appeal by targeting North Carolina white women. In mid-September, Helms’s wife 
Dorothy stumped for her husband in Wake County and Durham in the Triangle Area and in 
High Point and Lexington in the North Carolina Piedmont. She declared Helms “a symbol of 
the whole conservative cause” who fought against “labor unions, radical feminists, 
homosexual groups . . . and the liberal press” who “came into North Carolina from all across 
the country.” The senator’s wife also penned a fundraising letter in honor of her husband’s 
birthday. In the letter, she described her husband as a “decent and a kind-hearted man . . . 
who is not capable of a hateful act.” She wrote that she knew the “vicious personal attacks” 
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perpetrated by Hunt “hurt” her husband, but that “Jesse’s tough. He has learned to smile and 
bear it . . . I know my Jesse Helms.”36  
Another Republican woman, Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole, returned to 
her home state to campaign for Helms at a fundraiser and appear in one of his television 
advertisements. At the fundraiser, she stated that she knew Helms extremely well and that he 
was “a man of great integrity, a man with courage and conviction” who will “deal straight 
with you.” Secretary Dole further noted that the president’s administration failed to 
communicate clearly that Reagan had worked to support women. She pointed out that 
Reagan appointed Sandra Day O’Connor to the Supreme Court, as well as her own 
appointment along with two other women to his cabinet. In the advertisement produced by 
Helms’s campaign, the secretary reminisced on a story she had read in a newspaper about the 
Helms’s adoption of their special-needs son Charles. Though she admired the senator for “a 
lot of reasons,” she said, this was the “reason I admire Jesse Helms the most.”37 
The Hunt campaign addressed women through its advertising as well with a focus on 
economic mobility, domestic roles, and spousal relationships, all stressing the evolution in 
the gender roles assigned to women in the traditional South from homemakers and caregivers 
to an integral part of North Carolina’s economy. In an advertisement targeted for white 
working-class women, photographs of a white female textile worker followed through her 
day at work and then at home spending time with her family. The narrator opined that after 
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“long hours in the mill, bone tired . . .  she comes home to more work,” including “keeping a 
house” and “raising a family.” She was a “partner with her husband, working to keep their 
dreams alive.” “The working woman in North Carolina,” the narrator declared, had “new 
responsibilities and new possibilities,” and that “North Carolina people don’t try to hold back 
the future,” but “just work to make it better.”38 
To define an alternative vision of a New South dedicated to women’s rights that 
contrasted with the traditional reproductive roles of women that southern culture embraced, 
the Hunt campaign addressed reproductive freedom and abortion in the last weeks of the 
campaign. Focusing on a 1981 Senate bill sponsored by Helms, a radio ad broadcast in late-
October featured a female narrator who decried a “bill in the United States Senate called S-
158.” According to the narrator, the proposed legislation that Helms sponsored “could outlaw 
many of the birth control devices that millions of American women use today.” The ad 
connected Helms with the Moral Majority, stating that “some people call it the Jerry Falwell 
bill,” because of its “sweeping attempt . . . to turn his personal religious views into the law of 
the land.” The narrator charged that the proposed law “would outlaw abortion even in a case 
of rape or incest,” and that the “woman would have to carry the child of a rapist or go to jail.” 
She underlined Helms’s connection to the right when she claimed that “S-158” was “one 
more part of the right-wing agenda that is Jesse Helms’s top priority in the Senate.”39 
Though the radio ad was, as Pearce recalled, a “half-assed” attempt to address the 
abortion issue, the commercial worried the Helms campaign. Both Carter Wrenn and Tom 
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Ellis felt panic when the ad hit the radio waves, and Wrenn noted that “we dropped like a 
rock with women.” In an effort to slow the decrease in polling numbers, the campaign 
presented Dorothy Helms in a rebuttal ad for television in which she held an audio recording 
of the ad and attacked Hunt’s ethics and morality. She declared the ad to be an “out-and-out 
falsehood” that was both “disgusting and dishonest.” She admonished Hunt, stating that she 
would “never have believed Jim Hunt would stoop this low.” Helms himself emphatically 
denounced the ad and, though there was no mention of the president in the ad, stated that “the 
public should share my outrage over this cynical, insensitive and outrageous smear of the 
president and me.” He called Hunt a “consummate liar” and “the great manipulator” who 
“prey[ed] upon the fears of the people of North Carolina.” The senator, responding to the 
ad’s charge of a connection with the radical right, said that “he’d rather have those supporters 
than some Hunt has.” Mentioning a known homosexual who supported the governor, the 
senator, mocking a limp wrist, told a group of supporters that “he’s one of these . . . you 
know.”40 
Another element in the traditional culture of the South was a strong commitment to 
national defense and the military and a fierce sense of patriotism. With both candidates in 
vocal support of a strong national defense, Helms and Hunt also closely courted the votes of 
Tar Heel veterans. They each had their own veterans support groups and attacked one 
another on policies affecting veterans, including funding of the Veterans Administration. 
During the third debate, Hunt accused Helms of voting in favor of reduced veterans’ 
pensions and medical benefits. The governor also claimed that Helms had “even voted for 
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cuts that would force some VA hospitals and clinics to shut down.” Helms responded that he 
had been endorsed by the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), and that he “hadn’t cast any 
votes against veterans.” He said that veterans knew that Hunt would “flip-flop” and that 
“they’ve been dealing with me a long time.”41  
As the two candidates argued over their support of veterans during the debate, Helms 
quipped, “governor, which war did you serve in?” Hunt, who had not served in the military, 
stated “I didn’t serve in a war,” to which Helms responded, “okay.” Hunt followed up 
angrily, “I don’t like you questioning my patriotism.” Prior to the debate, the North Carolina 
Veterans of Foreign Wars endorsed Hunt, and, according to Link, Helms took it as a “terrible 
blow.” The blows kept coming for Helms regarding veterans when in late-October, the 
national VFW withdrew its endorsement of Helms, blaming a computer error for tabulating 
the organization’s endorsement. Hunt used the endorsement withdrawal to underline his 
charge that Helms had “voted against the veterans every time he’s turned around,” noting 
“that’s exactly what he deserved.” When Helms learned about the loss of the endorsement, he 
charged that the head of the VFW supported Hunt. Regardless of the lost endorsement, 
Helms said, “I think the veterans of North Carolina agree with me and not the hierarchy in 
Washington.”42 
With so much focus on various segments of North Carolina’s overwhelmingly white 
electorate, from homosexuals to evangelical Christians, the elderly, women, and veterans, 
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race continued as an issue that both candidates used to stir voters’ passions. While all the 
other themes within the campaign carried emotional weight, race remained as the 
foundational element in the candidates’ competing brands of whiteness. Hunt’s campaign 
distributed a flyer that quoted a report in the Wall Street Journal that claimed Helms used the 
“pet name” Fred when referring to blacks. Helms’s black campaign press secretary Claude 
Allen, himself a black man, accused the Hunt campaign of using the charge to “incite 
emotions against Senator Helms.” He continued, stating that Hunt had been advertising in 
black newspapers in North Carolina that attacked Helms’s stand against the Martin Luther 
King holiday. The News & Observer reported that an ad in July editions of black newspapers, 
including The Winston-Salem Chronicle, stated that “Jim Hunt supported a federal holiday 
honoring Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and blacks and whites who fought for civil rights and 
freedom.” It also pointed out that “Helms opposed the bipartisan coalition of 10 of North 
Carolina’s 11 House members and opposed the holiday.” In response to Allen’s charge, Will 
Marshall, Hunt’s campaign press secretary, stated that Hunt supported “civil rights before all 
kinds of audiences.”43 
During the second debate, the King holiday re-emerged as a contentious issue when 
Helms repeated Allen’s allegations that Hunt advertised in support of the holiday in black 
newspapers while not doing so in newspapers distributed in primarily white markets. He told 
the governor that “you were hiding your position from two-thirds of the people who oppose 
that holiday.” Hunt responded that the allegation was “absolutely untrue” and that he had 
“been on record in news conference after news conference” in support of the holiday “in 
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honor of all the citizens, black and white, who have worked for equal opportunity, have 
worked for the future of this state and this country, where people can work together.” Hunt 
continued, “this is 1984,” and that “we’re not going to go back now and open those old 
wounds.” When Helms pressed again on the issue, Hunt responded, “I’ll put ads wherever I 
choose to put them . . . Surely, you’ll let me decide where to put the little bit of money I 
have.” Though Hunt was passionate in his response to Helms’s challenge, in a post-debate 
interview political scientist Merle Black stated that the governor handily deflected the 
charges put forth by Helms concerning the holiday without responding to them directly.44 
By late September, the Helms campaign began ushering black evangelical supporters 
into his campaign’s spotlight. James E. Johnson, director of the American Constitution 
Political Action Committee and a former assistant secretary of the Navy, arrived in North 
Carolina to stump for Helms on September 29. He told reporters that the idea that Helms 
stood against civil rights was “just not so.” He claimed that if the senator “did not do 
anything more than oppose abortion, he would go down as one of the greatest senators in 
history,” and that he “[believed] a person’s life should line up with Scripture.” He went 
further, underlining the senator’s evangelical positions, and declaring that those who 
supported “abortion, homosexuality, and lesbianism, which are abominations unto God, then 
a person is not lining up with Scripture.” He equated Roe v. Wade (1973), that Johnson said 
“ruled that the unborn child was not a human being,” with the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott 
decision in 1857 that stated, according to Johnson, “blacks were not legal human beings.”45 
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Helms continued in his attempt to appeal to black evangelicals in October when he 
welcomed former NFL star Roosevelt Grier into his campaign. Grier accompanied Helms at 
a campaign rally in North Carolina’s Research Triangle Park where Helms said, regarding 
civil rights legislation, “we don’t need legislation. We need the Ten Commandments.” He 
referred to former Senator Sam Ervin, saying that much of the legislation put forth by 
Congress, including civil rights legislation and Affirmative Action, “has . . . been harmful to 
good race relations.” North Carolina blacks, Helms declared, did not need to depend on the 
government for social and economic equality. When reporters asked Grier about his opinion 
concerning Helms’s position on the King holiday, he replied that he had “nothing against 
Senator Helms for that” and believed Helms was a man who believed in “one nation under 
God.” The Helms campaign featured Grier in a statewide television advertisement in which 
he professed his admiration of the senator for his “courage to fight for what he believes in” 
and declared, “count me in as one more American proud to stand tall with Senator Jesse 
Helms.”46 
Grier also accompanied Helms to a speech the senator gave at historically-black 
Livingstone College, a private college in Salisbury. Grier addressed a group of students, 
professing his faith that Helms would continue to lead the country as “one nation under 
God.” The college had invited both Helms and Hunt to speak as part of a lecture series, but 
Hunt had sent a campaign surrogate to speak on his behalf on an earlier date. Helms accepted 
and told an audience of 130 students and guests that he hoped that “faith in the Lord” would 
be the “common denominator” that would bring people together. He claimed that there was a 
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“situation in America today where minorities and particularly the black race [was] being used 
and has been used politically.” He stated that Democrats were “jerking” black voters around 
and that “you are taken for granted.” He repeated his belief in the importance of the “free-
enterprise system” to lift black Americans economically and socially. He also told the 
audience of black students that “people who brought slaves over here were blacks 
themselves.” He told the group that neither he or anyone in is family ever “owned a slave.” 
Leland noted that the senator’s address began “calmly” and that Helms emphasized the 
importance of listening to “people with whom you disagree,” but that “he became agitated” 
when asked questions that focused on his past statements about blacks and civil rights. 
Overall, as Elizabeth Leland reported, the senator’s address “elicit[ed] whispered comments 
from the audience” of black college students that showed their dissatisfaction with Helms.47 
Helms’s inclusion of Grier drew sharp criticism from the black North Carolina elite. 
The vice president of the state’s NAACP, Kelly Alexander Jr. called Grier a “black 
carpetbagger” and noted that because Helms “couldn’t find anyone in North Carolina who 
lived here and voted here,” the senator “had to bring in some hired guns.” Irving L. Joyner, 
the president of the North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers, said that he did not blame 
Grier for his support of the senator, but that he was “misinformed about the history of Jesse 
Helms.” He further alleged that Helms used Grier to show that he was “not as bad as he has 
been painted to be on the race issue” and to win the votes of white moderates. The black 
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lawyer claimed further that “Helms’ record” could not be “erase[d] merely by” Grier 
“appearing in some commercial.”48 
Hunt worked to encourage the inclusion of the wider black community in North 
Carolina politics in the closing weeks of the campaign. Before speaking at a rally at Wake 
Forest University in Winston-Salem, he spoke to a crowd of some 600 black North 
Carolinians in early October and noted the progress that had been made during his eight 
years as governor, including the black judges he had appointed and black officials elected to 
various local offices including sheriffs and education board members. He told the group that 
North Carolinians had “learned to live together, to work together, to play together.” He 
emphasized that Helms sought to instigate racial animosities between whites and blacks who 
had overcome traditional racial animosities to become a “brotherhood.” Later in the same 
month, Hunt addressed the North Carolina NAACP, telling 150 supporters that Helms “[had] 
been trying to tell you that you don’t know where I stand.” The governor contrasted his 
positions concerning the growth of the black electorate and civil rights, declaring that “you 
know where I stand and you know where Jesse Helms stands.”49 
The governor also addressed black North Carolinians who had become complacent 
with regard to voting by producing seven radio advertisements featuring black North 
Carolinians. Wake County Sheriff John Baker, Charlotte Mayor Harvey Gantt, pop singer 
Roberta Flack, and University of North Carolina basketball player Sam Perkins narrated the 
ads and stressed the importance of black participation in the election. John Baker declared in 
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one that he “was elected sheriff in Wake County by people who cared enough to get 
involved.” In another, Baker noted that he supported Hunt, and that “Hunt has always been 
there fighting for us.” Gantt noted that “it amazes me that some people say they don’t plan on 
voting.” He also pointed out that he never would have been elected had the black community 
in Charlotte not voted for him. Flack reminded black voters of “the trouble so many people 
went to to win the right to vote freely.” She invoked King, “how can they forget the dream 
our fathers and mothers, sisters and brothers fought to keep alive for us?” The ad that 
featured Perkins also invoked the memory of King when Perkins spoke of King’s dream, 
declaring that “we can only keep that dream alive if we exercise” the right to vote.50  
With the election close at hand, Helms and Hunt continued working for the white 
votes they needed to win, and the race to the finish was close. During the weekend before the 
election, the Gallup Organization released a poll taken the week before that showed Helms 
leading Hunt by 3 percent, 49 to 46, among likely voters. The poll of 1,873 registered voters 
claimed that Helms had picked up some ground among Tar Heel blacks, people with less 
than a high school education, and voters under the age of fifty. Hunt led by 5 percent in the 
eastern part of the state, Helms led in the mountains by 24 percent, and the two split the 
Piedmont with Helms at 48 percent and Hunt at 47. In the last days of the campaign Helms 
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held the lead, but there were still three days to make their final appeals and show that they 
represented the best interests of North Carolina.51 
On the Sunday and Monday prior to Election Day, the Hunt campaign aired a thirty-
minute message for prime-time television that sought to re-emphasize both his fiscal 
conservatism and Helms’s connection to right-wing ideologues, including Jerry Falwell, 
Phyllis Schlafly, and Sun Myung Moon. Hal Linden, a television actor and narrator of the 
program, noted Helms’s desire to institute school prayer and the senator’s connection with 
military dictators. Reminding viewers of Helms’s stand concerning Social Security, 
Medicare, and veteran’s benefits, Linden declared, “his position is consistent with his overall 
priorities.” The narrator posed a question, asking why the right-wing “network” raised “over 
$18 million” for Helms, and answered, “Jim Hunt.” Changing course, Linden declared that 
Hunt was among a “new breed of southern Democrats who have shaped their political 
philosophy around a new pragmatism that puts economic growth, jobs, and education at the 
head of their priorities.” Hunt, according to Linden, fought the fight against the “Helms 
network” in order to bring people together. In the narrator’s conclusion, the ad highlighted 
Hunt’s status as a fiscal conservative and declared that he would keep the Tar Heel state 
“moving ahead.”52 
Hunt himself concluded the advertisement, beginning with his regret that the 
campaign had become so negative. He touched on all the original themes of his campaign: 
the progressive tradition of the Tar Heel state, the ability that North Carolinians had to come 
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together and work for common purpose, and the capacity of the state and its people to “move 
forward” through any adversity. He spoke about his accomplishments as governor, pointing 
out the state’s fiscal conservatism during his tenure in office and noting that he supported an 
amendment to the Constitution that required a balanced federal budget. He pointed out the 
economic expansion the state had experienced and the improvements to education under his 
administration. After his continued profession of “progress,” Hunt made mention of the 
danger that Falwell and other right-wing conservatives posed to individual freedom and 
proclaimed that the fight against radical ideology was “fundamental” to the upcoming 
election. The lengthy advertisement ended with Hunt repeating a line from his most recent 
television ads that harkened back to the evocative phrases spoken by Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and John F. Kennedy, stating that “if we don’t believe and don’t care, nothing can save the 
nation; if we believe and care, nothing can stop us.”53 
The inclusive message Hunt sought to convey in this last appeal to a statewide 
audience mirrored the color-blind message he had championed since February. He spoke 
passionately about black leaders including Martin Luther King among black audiences and 
within black media markets. When it came to addressing mixed or white audiences however, 
Hunt used the color-blind rhetoric of whiteness to avoid stoking racial animosities among the 
white North Carolina electorate and advocated for a more inclusive politics. 
Hunt had railed against Helms’s ties to the religious right for months, and Helms 
responded to charges that he was a fundamentalist, saying, “That’s right. I plead guilty” to 
the North Carolina Christian Educators Association. He claimed to be “intrigued that I have 
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been repeatedly called the Prince of Darkness because of my efforts to restore school 
prayer,” and noted that he was a “right-wing extremist because I try to stand up for the most 
innocent and helpless of humans – the unborn children.” Summing up his campaign as a 
“cause” of religious nationalism, the senator said his campaign was “the conservative cause, 
the free-enterprise cause, but most of all, the cause of decency and honor and spiritual, moral 
cleanliness in America today.” He suggested that North Carolinians responded favorably to 
him because they loved both “their country and . . . their God.” The senator, recalling the 
successful character assassinations his campaign had run against Hunt, emphatically stated, 
“the man is not to be trusted,” and declared that he hoped “that he never has another day in 
public office after he’s finished his term as governor.” He characterized Hunt as “desperate,” 
“frustrated,” and “frightened,” and claimed that the negativity of the campaign was the 
governor’s fault.54 
Helms also continued his divisive politics of whiteness and persisted in provoking 
racial animosities held by the white electorate. In the closing days of the campaign the 
senator pointed out that the only way Hunt would win the election was if he won “an 
enormous bloc vote,” in reference to black North Carolinians. He further invigorated white 
evangelicals and other white cultural conservatives when he declared that he was “proud” of 
his relationships with the religious right and contrasted that relationship with the 
“homosexuals that support[ed]” Hunt.55 
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As the campaign approached Election Day, both candidates had to wait and see 
whose message North Carolina voters would prefer. Was it Helms, who worked tirelessly to 
energize white evangelicals and connected Hunt with the state’s homosexual community, 
feminists who supported abortion, and the black bloc vote? Or, would it be Hunt, who 
attempted to appeal to blacks, moderate whites, and traditional Democrats through a message 
of fiscal responsibility, moderate progress, and economic innovation, all of which he claimed 
would maintain North Carolina’s hope for the future? Both candidates campaigned through 
the end of the day on November 6 to spread their messages among the white North Carolina 
electorate. The two campaigns spent a total of over $26.5 million in their efforts to attract 
white voters. They bombarded the state with nearly 8,000 television ads in the last five weeks 
of the campaign in their attempts to attract white Tar Heel votes, with Helms’s ads playing at 
a margin of over two-to-one. Only one, however, would emerge victorious when the haze of 
the nearly two-year-long battle over the white soul of the state settled and the votes cast were 
counted.56 
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Conclusion 
Holding onto Traditional Whiteness: Helms Wins 
 
At around midnight on November 6, Jim Hunt told a crowd of followers at The 
Raleigh Inn, the “long and difficult battle [was] over,” and that, regardless of the result, “we 
must respect it.” At the North Raleigh Hilton, Jesse Helms proclaimed that voters “sent a 
signal throughout the world that North Carolina is a God-fearing, conservative state . . . 
where the majority of the people believe in the free-enterprise system and believe that it 
ought to be allowed to function.” With the election over and the votes counted, for the first 
time in over eighteen months the airwaves throughout North Carolina were void of political 
commercials from the campaigns of Jesse Helms and Jim Hunt.57 
 The senator narrowly defeated the governor with nearly 52 percent of the vote, 51.7 
to 47.8 percent for Hunt, a margin of just under 87,000 votes out of over two million cast. 
The senator, however, overwhelmingly won over white North Carolinians with 63 percent of 
the white vote. Though the overall results proved to be the narrowest margin of victory for 
Helms in his political career, he won the battle for the white soul of North Carolina, beating 
Hunt by 26 percent among white voters.58 
Ronald Reagan won North Carolina’s electoral votes for re-election and provided 
Helms with huge coattails on which to ride back to Washington. Tar Heels voted for the 
Republican president with 62 percent, an overwhelming rejection of the Democrats’ choice 
of the Minnesotan Walter Mondale. Only one other Republican, Richard Nixon in 1972, had 
																																																								
57 Christensen, “Helms Tops Hunt to Win Third Term,” Raleigh News & Observer, 
November 7, 1984; Elizabeth Leland, “Helms Says His Victory Shows N.C. is a ‘God-
Fearing’ State,” Raleigh News & Observer, November 7, 1984. 
58	Pearce, Jim Hunt, 188. 
	 116 
won North Carolina with more Tar Heel approval. The Reagan influence proved important. 
All the counties Helms won supported Reagan with voting margins of at least 60 percent.59 
In the days that followed, key players within both the Helms and Hunt campaigns 
offered explanations for the election’s outcome that varied from economics to party loyalty. 
The Congressional Club’s Tom Ellis said, “it was the mood of the country that helped,” and 
added that “Helms was as much a part of . . . the mood as Ronald Reagan was.” Both Joseph 
Grimsley, co-director of Hunt’s campaign, and Carter Wrenn, executive director of Helms’s 
Congressional Club, agreed that taxes posed the critical issue for the election. Gary Pearce, 
Hunt’s other co-director, said, “the lesson of this election is what the national Democratic 
Party is going to have to do to appeal to a broader spectrum of voters in the South.” Though 
none of them came out and said it, the campaign came down to race and an appeal to the 
whiteness within the state’s political culture. Noting the issue of race, Grimsley added that, 
though their campaign turned out the state’s black vote, “more people came that nobody 
turned out. They had a message to send, and they sent it.”60 
 Those who helped craft Helms’s message credited the senator’s victory to their 
successful advertising strategy. Though both campaigns combined spent over $26 million, 
Helms outspent Hunt by over six million with much of that going toward his television 
advertising. The Helms campaign believed that television offered the only way Helms could 
effectively communicate with the Tar Heel electorate. The day after the election, Carter 
Wrenn told a reporter that “none of the media was going to carry our message . . . Every one 
of them endorsed Hunt.” Tom Ellis echoed Wrenn’s statement, noting that Helms succeeded 
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by “telling the truth,” and asserted that the campaign “[used] enough television, radio, direct 
mail to go over the top of the North Carolina news media.”61 
Years later however, Wrenn experienced what he called a “shift in my own thinking.” 
With regard to the Raleigh News & Observer, the former executive director of Helms’s 
National Congressional Club said that “when I was really active politically, I thought they 
were biased, but the truth is I was just wrong.” A careful reading of the editorial pages of the 
News & Observer reveals that while the newspaper offered scathing opinions about Helms 
and generally more positive opinions for Hunt, the paper’s actual coverage proved to be just 
as critical of Hunt as it was of the senator.62   
 Both campaigns and their supporters succeeded in increasing voter registration among 
supporters of both candidates. The state’s voter turnout in 1984 exceeded that of the previous 
presidential election in 1980 by 1.57 percent, 68.45 to 66.88 percent. Black voter registration 
grew from 451,000 early in 1983 to roughly 619,000 by Election Day in 1984, an increase of 
some 168,000 voters. But, the actual turnout of black voters decreased slightly from 63 
percent in 1980 to 61 percent in 1984. The efforts of Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority 
provoked the registration of 200,000 evangelical fundamentalist voters during the election 
year. Most of these new white voters resided in blue-collar areas spanning the Piedmont 
Interstate 85 corridor from Raleigh to Charlotte. Lamarr Mooneyham, former North Carolina 
director for the Moral Majority, said that the churches in the rural and small-town 
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communities throughout the Piedmont “did the same thing on Sunday on Tuesday” by 
organizing and driving conservative Christians to the polls on Election Day.63 
 Helms’s greatest support came from white voters in the western Piedmont and the 
traditional Republican stronghold of the mountain west. The senator received between 60 and 
73 percent of the vote in the heavily white Piedmont counties of Stanley, Cabarrus, Gaston, 
Randolph, Davidson, Rowan, Davie, Yadkin, Catawba, Iredell, and Alexander. He carried 
the same margins in six mountain counties: Wilkes, Caldwell, Burke, Avery, Mitchell, and 
Henderson. The senator also garnered majorities of 50 to 59.9 percent in the largely rural 
Piedmont counties of Rockingham, Alamance, Stokes, Surry, Person, Montgomery, Moore, 
and Lee. All of the Piedmont counties Helms won, with the exception of Davie, Randolph, 
and Yadkin, had a majority of registered Democrats and a large population of white blue-
collar workers.64 
 Hunt performed best in the traditional Democratic stronghold of the eastern Coastal 
Plain and the metropolitan Piedmont counties of Wake, Guilford, Forsyth, and Mecklenburg. 
He won an overwhelming 90 percent of the black vote, particularly in black belt counties of 
the northeast—such  as Northampton, Gates, Hertford, Bertie, Edgecombe, and Greene—
where the nonwhite population approached or exceeded 50 percent. The governor also won 
the racially diverse counties of Robeson, Scotland, and Hoke on the Coastal Plain, and Anson 
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County in the southern Piedmont. The only counties Hunt won that were largely white were 
Orange, Durham, Wake, and Forsyth, which had nonwhite populations of about 10 to 25 
percent. Those metro-Piedmont counties, however, consisted of large white liberal and 
racially-moderate populations. Guilford and Mecklenburg counties, which the governor also 
won, had nonwhite populations of between 26 and 45 percent, along with comparably more 
white liberals than surrounding rural counties. The sizeable number of white liberals and 
blacks in these metropolitan counties provided Hunt with an edge and gave Helms less than 
50 percent of their vote, though not enough to counter the rural support given to the senator.65 
 Helms’s message proved persuasive in the traditional land of Democratic control. He 
succeeded in attracting a considerable number of white Democrats in the Coastal Plain who 
had come to be known as “Jessecrats.” He managed to win small majorities in the eastern 
counties of Harnett, Johnston, Nash, Wayne, Lenoir, Craven, Beaufort, Currituck, Dare, 
Onslow, New Hanover, and Brunswick. All those counties, except New Hanover, had 
substantial Democratic majorities among registered voters, ranging between 70 and nearly 90 
percent. Most of those counties also had nonwhite populations ranging from 10 to 45 percent, 
with the exception of Dare. In seven Coastal Plain counties, where Hunt had done well in the 
past, Helms won over 75 percent of white voters, but he also won the majority of white 
voters in all 41 counties in the eastern part of the state. These “disenfranchised Democrats,” 
as Helms called them, proved to be crucial to his victory. With Helms’s appeal to white 
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conservative Democrats, race played a major role in determining the outcome of the 
election.66 
 The cultural war of whiteness beyond race, including the debate over women’s 
reproductive rights and conservative evangelicalism, showed in the election results as well. 
Hunt performed extremely well among women, winning with a margin of 14 percent, 57 to 
43. Christians who described themselves as born-again voted for Helms by a 20 percent 
margin, 60 to 40, and self-described conservatives voted for the senator by a margin of 75 to 
25 percent. In one telling instance, when the governor was talking with voters waiting at a 
polling location, a young woman said that both she and her husband planned to vote “for the 
Christian,” meaning Helms, despite the fact that Hunt, too, was a life-long Christian. As Phil 
Carlton noted, those involved with the Hunt campaign knew this group proved to be a 
“problem.” He followed up, stating that “a lot of those people were first-time registered 
[voters]—your fundamentalist church folk.”67  
 Helms’s divisive use of whiteness proved more convincing to North Carolina’s white 
electorate than Hunt’s desire for inclusive politics. Though Hunt campaigned on tax cuts for 
the working and middle classes, fiscal conservatism, and a strong national defense, all 
important issues to white North Carolinians, white blue-collar Tar Heels and middle-class 
conservatives, particularly in the Piedmont and Coastal Plain, voted overwhelmingly for 
Helms. Helms’s classless language of the free-enterprise system and his use of anti-black 
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prejudice, which has always benefited those with more property, lessened class conflict and 
brought the white working and middle classes together with Tar Heel business owners, a key 
characteristic of whiteness. The senator’s character attacks proved successful in lessening the 
governor’s integrity and tarnishing his whiteness in the eyes of white Tar Heels.68  
 Hunt did all he could to keep from alienating white voters in his quest for a more 
inclusive whiteness with his largely color-blind message to white audiences, but his efforts 
did little more than add fuel to Helms’s character attacks. His attempt to energize black 
voters in conjunction with his color-blind appeals to white conservative Democrats reflected 
the flip-flopping characterization illustrated by Helms’s question, “where do you stand, 
Jim?” The governor distanced himself from a national Democratic Party that was too liberal 
to win statewide elections in the South. In only a few instances did the word “Democrat” 
show up in his advertising or addresses to white audiences, and when it did there were 
always the qualifiers “southern” or “North Carolina” to illustrate the governor’s moderate 
conservatism. Hunt failed to engage directly in a debate on race and, when pressed by Helms, 
evaded the issue. Hunt’s use of consensus, color-blind politics played against him when 
Helms challenged the governor on racial issues such as the Martin Luther King Jr. holiday 
and his connections with Jesse Jackson. The governor’s appeals to the state’s black electorate 
in black media markets remained largely absent from his campaign’s advertising in white 
media markets. In the end, his class-based and quasi-color-blind tactics failed to convince 
white conservative North Carolinians to vote for him. 
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 Hunt later admitted that the issue of race hurt him in the end, telling Gary Pearce in 
2010 that his connection with Jesse Jackson affected the relationship he had “with the kind of 
rural conservative vote that I’d always done pretty well with before.” Hunt knew that many 
conservative white North Carolinians had what the governor called “strong feelings against 
integration.” White conservative Tar Heels resented the successes of the civil rights 
movement of two decades prior, the last substantial affront to southern whiteness. With that 
last assault, white conservative North Carolinians sought the political means with which to 
protect it and found it in Jesse Helms.69  
 The blowback against racial integration only provided part of the animus felt by white 
Tar Heels in 1984. The economic revolution that benefited blacks and women through 
Affirmative Action endangered the opportunities experienced by the traditionally white-male 
working class. This instigated white resistance to Affirmative Action programs that sought to 
extend opportunity and greater economic mobility to underprivileged minorities and women. 
In addition, the cultural weight of the sexual revolution among women who sought to take 
control of reproductive rights and homosexuals who were becoming more visible in the 
country’s political discourse threatened the very existence of whiteness through a blurring of 
traditional gender roles and lower rates of reproduction.70 
Jesse Helms represented a whiteness that sought to quell any attack to the status quo 
by maintaining whiteness’s purity with regard to both race and culture. Jim Hunt, by contrast, 
sought a cautiously more inclusive whiteness based on racial diversity, the protection of 
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women’s rights, and a silent, passive acquiescence toward cultural others. Nevertheless, the 
governor’s desire for the political inclusion of cultural others required the consent of much of 
the state’s white population. By a narrow margin, North Carolina elected Jesse Helms to 
represent the state as a conservative Republican in the United States Senate. By a much 
larger margin, however, many white North Carolinians elected a standard-bearer in their 
ideologically-driven senator and rejected the inclusion of racial and cultural others in order to 
protect against further attacks on the culture of whiteness they were unwilling to see 
changed. 
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